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ABSTRACT 
 
CLAIRE MARIE WILLIAMS:  
 
Why Families Flee: A Study of Family Migration Patterns from the Northern 
Triangle of Central American 
 
(Under the direction of Dr. Oliver Dinius) 
 
 The past decade has witnessed an unprecedented increase in migrant families from the 
Northern Triangle, the region of Central America comprised of El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras. The mass influx in family migration has important consequences for destination 
countries like the United States and Mexico as well as the countries which they leave behind. 
This study aims to answer the question of how family migration patterns in the Northern 
Triangle of Central America have changed in the past decade and why. I outline the migration 
decisions of families through a qualitative and quantitative lens. I use newspapers and NGO 
reports to outline the plethora of factors which inhibit economic, social, and political progress in 
the region. Understanding the complex dynamics in the Triangle inform the logistic regression 
which provides data on the relationships between intentions to migrate and crime victimization, 
gender, household economic status, and household location. I used the LAPOP 
AmericasBarometer survey for the years 2012 and 2018 for all three countries to determine how 
patterns have changed and offer possible rationale for the shifts. The results indicate that crime 
victimization is less related to migration intentions relative to household income, gender, and 
rural status. This research may change the way we view migrant families from the Northern 
Triangle and inform policy solutions to what is now viewed as a humanitarian crisis.    
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CHAPTER ONE: A SCENE FROM THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE 
 
Migration from Northern Triangle of Central America has evolved over the past decade 
from a consistent stream of people into a full-fledged humanitarian crisis. The grave conditions 
on the ground in Central America have turned the triangular-shaped region comprised of El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras into a place overwhelmed by the exodus of children and 
parents. These country’s governments are faced with the challenge of averting these mass 
migrations and providing better conditions for their people. Emigration from the region, 
particularly migration caravans, has captured media attention around the world and provoked the 
perception that Northern Triangle governments are weak and powerless to amend the situation. 
Ultimately, the recent changes in family migration from the Northern Triangle transformed 
regional politics and requires new approaches across the board thus making it an area of crucial 
importance for academics and policy makers to further study. For many families, the risks 
involved with travelling to another country and establishing a new life abroad outweigh the risks 
of staying behind. Here are some of their stories:  
 At a migrant shelter in Mexico City, a Guatemalan family of four anxiously awaits the 
news which could changes their lives: whether they have been granted permission to enter the 
United States. The husband recounts how a gang in Guatemala was searching for him after he 
helped the police implicate some of its members in a kidnapping case. He used to own several 
properties in Guatemala but left hastily out of fear. He considered returning to sell those 
properties but if he dared to cross into Guatemala again, “they would kill [him].” He fled to 
Mexico ahead of his family but shortly after his departure the gangs began targeting his wife and 
two daughters, one is two years old while the other is just an infant. The gang members told his 
twenty-four-year old wife that “if [her] husband didn’t return, they were going to kill the two 
 2 
girls, or kidnap them.”1 They even threatened to pursue them into Mexico City. If the family’s 
asylum petition gets denied, the young parents will be forced to continue their search for a 
country to raise their children in peace.  
 A twenty-three year old Honduran mother, six months pregnant with her second child, 
sits with her seven-year old daughter clinging to her arm. She describes her journey fleeing 
domestic violence after she separated from the father of her children. Shortly after the 
relationship ended, she began seeing another man. Both men threatened to harm her, so she left 
and headed north with her daughter and carrying her unborn child. After four months of travel, 
the family found a temporary shelter in Mexico. By this point, her daughter has been deprived of 
formal schooling for over a year. The trek through mountains and deserts brought with it many 
traumas of its own that cause the pair to cry spontaneously upon remembering them. She hopes 
to give birth to her second child in the United States “where [she] has family, and where [she] 
would feel supported and secure.”2 She still believes that the journey was worth it despite the 
emotional and physical toll placed upon her and her daughter. Staying put was simply not an 
option.  
Óscar and Valeria Martinez left El Salvador so he could find a job and buy the pair a 
house of their own. Óscar’s mother encouraged him before he left not “to pursue the ‘American 
dream’ because it is not easy to cross the southern border.”3 He ignored her advice and set out 
with high hopes for their future. After many days travelling through gang-filled territories in the 
scorching heat, all that stood between them and America was a swim through the river. When the 
strong current snatched Valeria from his grasp, Óscar desperately swam after her, but both 
 
        1 Schifrin, Nick. Running for Their Lives Was the Only Option for These Migrants. PBS, 2018.  
2 Ibid. 
3Sibrián, Walter, Mariana Arévalo, and Beatriz Calderon. “‘Le Pedí Que No Siguiera El Sueño Americano’: Madre 
de Migrante Salvadoreño Ahogado Junto a Hija.” La Prensa Gráfica, June 25, 2019. 
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drowned in search of a better life. The Salvadoran father and toddler’s bodies washed up on the 
shore of the Rio Grande river one mile from Brownsville, Texas. The photo of the limp bodies 
gripped headlines around the world in the summer of 2019. Their dream was never realized. The 
harrowing images of the father and daughter still intertwined on the riverbank represent the 
sacrifice and harsh truth of Central American migration. 
Over the past decade, more and more stories of migrants like these from Guatemala, 
Honduras, and El Salvador have surfaced revealing a new reality for the region at large. Families 
are pouring out of Central America in extraordinary numbers to escape gang violence, abuse, 
economic turmoil, and overall instability. The search of a better life for oneself and one’s family 
in the Northern Triangle was and still is real. It is a humanitarian tragedy. Now more than ever, it 
is important to address the motivations and patterns that push these families to leave. 
The Research Question 
For this project, I hope to answer how family migration patterns in the Northern Triangle 
of Central America have changed in the past decade and why. This research is a response to the 
uproar about migrant caravans, the United States’ recent family separation policy, and the 
political polarization over border security due to the sharp increase in migrants arriving at the 
US-Mexico border. I aspire to lay out the decision making process of Northern Triangle migrant 
families for to academics, policy makers, and the general public with hopes of contributing to a 
solution to this crisis. 
I will employ a mixed methods approach to analyze pertinent migration variables through 
a newspaper analysis and document trends in family migration over time using quantitative data. 
The principal data source is the Latin American Public Opinion Project’s (LAPOP) 
AmericasBarometer survey for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras for the years 2012 and 
2018. Given the large change in family migration patterns between those two years, the time 
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frame will serve as a good case study for analysis. The combination of the qualitative and 
quantitative sections will outline the migration decisions of families and help explain the shift in 
migration patterns from Mexican single adults to family units from the Northern Triangle.  
For the purposes of this study, family will be considered in a broad way. “Family” in the 
Latin American context is more loosely defined than the traditional, biological American family. 
Jan Kok’s “The Family Factor in Migration Decisions,” views family as “socially significant kin 
with whom one shares basic activities.”4 While US Customs and Border Patrol employs a 
nuclear definition of “family,” Kok’s definition more adequately captures the nature of families 
in Latin America in which extended family members often take on the role of immediate kin. 
The data selected to study family migration aims to follow Kok’s guidelines for characterizing a 
family.  
The International Consequences 
The consequences of family migration from the Northern Triangle transcend Central 
America. The mass migration of families from the region has transformed into a crisis. The net 
migration numbers, which are the net number of people who have either entered or exited a 
country over a given five year period, are staggering. For El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, 
net migration as of 2018 is -34,000, -46,073, and -202,694 people respectively.5 The countries 
have become epicenters of exodus making any form of development extremely difficult.  
The three countries already suffered from a lack of economic and social progress which is 
compounded by the departure of a significant portion of the workforce. GDP per capita (in 2011 
constant international dollars) in Costa Rica, one of Central America’s most developed countries, 
 
4 Kok, Jan. “The Family Factor in Migration Decisions.” In Migration History in World History: Multidisciplinary 
Approaches. Brill, 2010. Pg. 215-50. 
5 World Development Indicators 2018, The World Bank, 2018. https://data.worldbank.org 
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is over $15,000. In El Salvador and Guatemala, that number drops to around $7,400 and $7,500. 
Honduras’s GDP per capita sits at a remarkably low $4,560.6 According to the Social Progress 
Index, a measurement of non-economic indicators such as basic well-being, access to basic 
human needs, and personal opportunities, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras fall into the 
fourth of six global tiers with rankings of 83, 96, and 99 of the 146 countries studied. They 
receive the lowest rankings of any Latin American countries included in the index (Venezuela 
was not studied).7 Under these conditions, many families feel as though their home nation cannot 
adequately provide for them.  
Organized crime and violence also disrupt the wellbeing of Northern Triangle residents. 
This region is considered to be the most dangerous outside of active war zones. In 2018, 
homicide rates per 100,000 people were 22 people in Guatemala, 40 in Honduras, and 51 in El 
Salvador. Mexico, a country with a reputation for widespread violence, had a homicide rate of 26 
people per 100,000 in 2018 while Costa Rica, one of the safest countries in Central America, had 
a rate of 13 people per 100,000 for comparison.8 Clearly, everyday violence poses a threat to the 
well-being and security of Northern Triangle residents. 
The crisis is not only a humanitarian one, but also an inter-regional one. Changes in the 
scale and nature of Central American migration have disrupted regional politics and challenged 
countries to adapt to new realities. The family migration wave imposes a large burden on 
destination countries such as the United States and Mexico. Since 2012, the number of family 
units apprehended at the United States border has increased five-fold with most families coming 
from Central America as opposed to Mexico (see Department of Homeland Security graph 
 
6 Ibid. 
7 “2018 Social Progress Index Executive Summary.” Social Progress Imperative, n.d.  
8 Labrador, Rocio, and Danielle Renwick. “Central America’s Violent Northern Triangle.” Washington DC: Council 
on Foreign Relations, June 26, 2018.  
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below).9 The apprehensions of Mexican nationals at the US border have in fact reached near 40-
year lows over the past decade.10 It is estimated that between 80 and 90% of Central American 
migrants in recent years travel to the United States though some choose other countries in the 
region such as Panama and Costa Rica.11  
With over 100,000 family units arriving at the United States southern border in recent years, the 
debate over how to handle the massive migrant flow emerges. Previously, single, male adults 
from Mexico dominated migration patterns but the influx of Northern Triangle families produces 
new challenges for destination countries. The responsibility for these migrant’s well-being now 
predominantly falls on the governments of Mexico and the United States. These countries are 
forced to consider new asylum quotas and humane detainment strategies to accommodate the 
 
9 “Recent Migration to the United States from Central America: Frequently Asked Questions.” Congressional 
Research Service, January 29, 2019.  
10 Restrepo, Dan, Trevor Sutton, and Joel Martinez. “Getting Migration in the Americas Right.” Center for 
American Progress, June 24, 2019.  
11EFE. “Cuanto Paga Un Centroamericano Para Cumplir El Sueño Americano.” La Prensa Gráfica, September 23, 
2019.  
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immense influx of families while their already overloaded immigration systems struggle to 
process the sheer numbers cases to review.  
The Region as Part of a Global Trend 
Migration in the Northern Triangle is part of a worldwide pattern. The Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which includes predominantly European 
countries, Canada, the United States, Japan, South Korea, Mexico and Chile among a few other 
non-European nations, conducts research regarding family migration as a trend. In 2016, more 
than 1.8 million new migrants moved to the OECD countries for family reasons. The majority of 
these (approximately 1.6 million) emigrated with the intentions of family formation and family 
reunification.12 A much smaller percentage fall into the “accompanying family member” 
category with around 270,000 people reported in 2016.13  
 Northern Triangle migration aligns with hemispheric migration patterns, particularly of 
asylum seekers. The widespread instability in Central and South America has increased the 
amount of asylum seekers in the region, fleeing because of persecution, war, or violence, to seek 
refugee status and receive protection and material assistance. According to the UN High Council 
on Refugees (UNHCR), there were between 500,000 and 550,000 refugees and asylum seekers 
in the Western Hemisphere from 2008-2013. That number jumped to 870,000 people in 2017 and 
exceeded one million by mid 2018.14 See the graph below for the regional breakdown.  
 
12 Migration Data Portal. “Family Migration,” May 22, 2019.  
13 Ibid  
14 Restrepo, Dan, Trevor Sutton, and Joel Martinez. “Getting Migration in the Americas Right.” Center for 
American Progress, June 24, 2019. 
 8 
 
The UNHCR indicates a notable increase in asylum seekers from the Northern Triangle 
countries. Asylum seeker populations grow 2128% in Honduras, 1275% in El Salvador, and 
1115% in Guatemala from 2012 to 2018 (as seen in the graph above). This change implies that 
conditions in the Northern Triangle are encouraging migrant families to leave in greater numbers 
than they have before. Central American family migration, though especially pertinent to the 
United States, corresponds with broader migration trends globally and regionally.  
 
Historical Background  
  
The adverse conditions that encourage Northern Triangle residents to emigrate today 
stem from a complex history of interaction by military governments and foreign actors, 
specifically the United States throughout the 20th century. In El Salvador in 1932, a peasant 
uprising against the dictatorship in power provoked a military response that killed 30,000 
civilians, most of whom were of indigenous descent.15 The political violence between leftist 
guerillas and right-winged paramilitaries spiraled out of control in the following decades. In the 
 
15 “El Salvador.” San Francisco, CA: The Center for Justice and Accountability, n.d.  
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1980’s, a 12 year civil-war broke out which ravished the country and claimed the lives of over 
75,000 Salvadorans via massacres, executions, and bombings.16 At the same time, the United 
States spearheaded the counter-insurgency in which they trained and funded death squads and 
facilitated the creation of a militarized society.17 After the signing of the Chapultepec Peace 
Accords in 1992, the civil war finally ended and a United Nations Truth Commission was 
created to document the civil rights abuses from the war. Five days after the commission released 
its report in 1993, which implicated many military and paramilitary members, the government 
adopted an amnesty law which protected government officials and guerilla fighters from their 
war crimes and human rights violations. The law sent a message to the country that crimes can 
go unpunished in Salvadoran society. The war and lack of justice triggered mass migration from 
El Salvador to the United States where marginalized immigrant groups formed the gang that 
evolved into the modern Mara Salvatrucha, also known as MS-13. Over multiple US 
presidencies, members of the Mara were deported back to El Salvador where the gang further 
organized and evolved into a dominant criminal group within the region.18 From the civil war to 
now, Salvadorans have been tormented by the violence of everyday life. 
In Guatemala, the United States sponsored a coup in 1954 to overthrow the 
democratically elected and left-leaning Jacobo Árbenz and installed a military dictatorship with 
help from the Central Intelligence Agency. Under a series of authoritarian rulers and a 36-year-
long civil war, death squads exterminated rural citizens, particularly Maya populations, and 
committed large scale human rights abuses. The post-Arbenz era ushered in decades of 
instability and strife which culminated in the deaths of over 200,000 indigenous people from 
 
16 Allison, Mike. “El Salvador’s Brutal Civil War: What We Still Don’t Know.” Al Jazeera, March 1, 2012.  
17 “U.S. Training Salvadoran Forces Linked with Death Squads.” Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 
April 9, 1984.  
18 “MS-13 Gang: The Story behind One of the World’s Most Brutal Street Gangs.” BBC, April 19, 2017.  
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1960-1996.19 In 1982, General Ríos Montt took control of Guatemala. Though he allied himself 
with President Reagan and Christian conservatives in the US, his one-year presidency represents 
the bloodiest in the country’s existence. He instituted a “scorched earth policy” against the Maya, 
sanctioned raids of over 600 indigenous villages, and facilitated the death or disappearance of 
over 70,000 indigenous Guatemalans.20 Over half a million Mayans were displaced or fled the 
country as a result of what many consider a genocide. Guatemala still suffers from serious 
distrust between civilians and governments in addition to years of corrupt leaders, violence, and 
poverty. The president from 2016-2020, a former actor and comedian named Jimmy Morales, 
shut down the UN-supported International Committee against Impunity in Guatemala in 2018 
thus furthering the government’s ability to act arbitrarily. Over twenty years after the series of 
peace agreements signed in 1996 to end the conflict, Guatemala still feels the consequences of 
violence, intimidation, and a widespread culture of impunity for criminal and political actors.   
During the majority of the 20th century, Honduras remained relatively immune to the 
violence that El Salvador and Guatemala experienced. Their luck shifted in the 70’s and 80’s 
when the United States staged a war against communism in Latin America by stationing troops 
in Honduras to combat the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. The US Central Intelligence Agency and 
FBI trained the notorious Battalion 316, the Honduran death squad well versed in interrogation 
and torture tactics, in the southwestern deserts of the US in order to assassinate political targets. 
The militarization of Honduras created a culture of repression with widespread poverty and 
human rights abuses that helped provoke mass migration to the United States beginning in the 
1990’s. To compound the political turmoil, Hurricane Mitch, a category five hurricane landed in 
 
19 Borger, Julian. “Fleeing a Hell the US Helped Create: Why Central Americans Journey North.” The Guardian, 
December 19, 2018.  
20 “Guatemala: ‘Silent Holocaust.’” San Francisco, CA: The Center for Justice and Accountability, n.d.  
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Honduras in late October of 1998. The rain brought on by the hurricane triggered floods and 
mudslides which wiped out much of the country’s crops and infrastructure. The instability 
continued in the wake of the hurricane’s destruction when a coup d’état in 2009, backed by 
former Battalion 316 leaders and the United States, removed President Manuel Zelaya from 
power. The political unrest protected criminal actors from accountability, and the murder rate 
soared. By 2010, Honduras became the most violent country in the world not at war.21 The 
historic and current volatility in Honduras resulted in many of the modern issues that persist in 
the country today. 
Primary and Secondary Literature 
 Surprisingly, there is little academic literature that covers family migration as a process 
generally and in Central America. The majority of the coverage of this issue rather comes from 
primary sources such as news articles which form the bulk of the sources used in this thesis. I 
selected one major national news source from each country to use in the analysis. La Prensa 
Gráfica from El Salvador is one of the two largest newspapers in the country and is known for its 
credibility. La Prensa Libre from Guatemala is also one of the most widely circulated 
publications within the country and is known for its non-sensationalist approach to news. Lastly, 
La Prensa from Honduras is not as popular as the other publications but is one of the most 
centrist papers which makes it ideal for discussing the realities of a polarizing topic such as 
migration. Assorted other publications like Al Jazeera, BBC, CNN, The Guardian, and PBS are 
cited for specific areas of interest as well.  
 The majority of secondary source data comes from think tanks, the US Government, the 
United Nations (UN), and the World Bank. The research organizations selected include the 
 
21 “Honduras: Battalion 316.” San Francisco, CA: Center for Justice and Accountability, n.d.  
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Social Progress Imperative, The Center for Justice and Accountability, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the Center for American Progress, and the Washington Office on Latin 
America. These sources offer well-verified statistics and documented histories of events in the 
region. United States government data comes from Customs and Border Patrol documents as 
well as the Congressional Research Service. The government data serves to document the 
changes in the phenomenon over time in a consistent and verifiable manner. Lastly, the UN and 
World Bank offer cross-country statistics which facilitated my international comparisons.  
I cite the main academic contributors to the field of family migration though quantity of 
academic literature on the subject is sparse. Jan Kok, director of the Radboud Group for 
Historical Demography and Family History at Radboud University in the Netherlands, wrote a 
book on family migration in 2010 entitled The Family Factor in Migration Decisions.  Her 
theories help shape the framework in which social scientists decipher whether migrants act out of 
self-interest or the interests of the other family members. There are multiple different ways to 
address the challenge of studying families and their intentions to migrate: analyzing the timing of 
the move as it relates to one’s economic situation, comparing the life courses of movers and 
stayers, and using qualitative materials “in combination with quantitative materials to reconstruct 
the motives and intra-family deliberations behind migration.”22 The third strategy she proposes 
will be employed in this paper. Wendy A. Vogt, an associate professor of anthropology at IUPUI 
in Indianapolis, specializes in migration spaces and the transit process in Latin America. Her 
article, “Crossing Mexico: Structural Violence and the Commodification of Undocumented 
Central American Migrants,” documents the harsh conditions on the journey from Central 
America to the US and the flourishing criminal economy created by illegally transporting 
 
22 Kok, Jan. “The Family Factor in Migration Decisions.” Pg. 233.  
 13 
migrants.23 The International Migration Review’s “Crime Victimization in Latin America and 
Intentions to Migrate to the United States” helped inspire my methodology.24 The researchers in 
this study also used the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey to test how crime victimization 
influences people’s intentions to migrate across Latin America using regression analysis. I 
adapted my study, based on the methods employed in this one, to fit the family criteria and 
increase the number of variables analyzed. These three academic sources aided me in defining 
family migration, describing the migration journey, and developing the quantitative framework 
for my analysis.  
Limitations 
This study provides fundamental insight into the migration intentions of families in the 
Northern Triangle. However, relying on newspaper data, surveys, and first-hand accounts brings 
with it some limitations. Newspaper data may contain bias. Reporters are often driven by 
readership as opposed to objectivity so the articles used in this study could disproportionately 
exaggerate or understate different issues. Social desirability bias, an inherent limitation of 
surveys, may pressure some respondents to answer a certain way to satisfy the researcher. In this 
case, respondents may be afraid of reporting being crime victims or ashamed of claiming their 
low income status which could alter the results. The nationally representative nature of the 
AmericasBarometer which allows LAPOP to create a diverse sample pool represents both an 
advantage and a disadvantage. The representativeness of the survey increases the sample size 
which increases the validity of the results. On the other hand, the broadness also inhibits the 
ability to understand how certain variables affect different subgroups in society. If this research 
 
23 Vogt, Wendy. “Crossing Mexico: Structural Violence and the Commodification of Undocumented Central 
American Migrants.” American Ethnologist 40, no. 4 (November 2013): 764–80.  
24 Wood, Charles H., Chris L. Gibson, Ludmila Ribeiro, and Paula Hamsho-Diaz. “Crime Victimization in Latin 
America and Intentions to Migrate to the United States.” International Migration Review 44, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 3–
24.  
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were to be repeated, I would suggest comparing the regressions of subgroups like women, 
indigenous groups, and rural residents with the results of the overall sample. 
 When working with survey data that is not one’s own, a researcher is also limited by the 
questionnaire. Due to updated versions of the questionnaire each year, I was unable to limit the 
survey to respondents with children of all ages which would have broadened the sample size and 
increased the validity of the results. In an ideal world, I would have included an intermediary 
year (such as 2014) in the analysis to ensure that family migration trends follow a consistent 
pattern and are not isolated to specific years. However, the inconsistency of questions related to 
my study in the LAPOP surveys and the extra complexity that another year would have added 
encouraged me to pursue two-year project as opposed to a three-year one. Additionally, for all 
three countries, the number of respondents who affirmatively claim intentions to migrate is much 
smaller in 2012 than in 2018 which is consistent with the well-documented trends in migration 
patterns. Although the LAPOP surveys are representative of each country’s populations, the 
smaller sample size in 2012 could negatively affect the legitimacy of the results. Lastly, , the 
questionnaire tracks migrants’ “intentions” to migrate rather than migration behavior itself, so it 
is impossible to determine whether respondents act according to their responses. This will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE MIGRATION PROCESS EACH STEP OF THE WAY 
Chapter Approach  
This chapter addresses Northern Triangle migration factors in the three key areas: the 
migrant’s home country, the journey to a destination country, and the arrival in the destination 
country. Unlike for the case of war zones, there is no single overarching reason for mass family 
migration from the Northern Triangle. The exodus of families rather derives from an 
agglomeration of social, political, and economic factors. The themes covered in this chapter will 
include drivers of migration in the families’ home countries (poverty, extortion, violence, gender 
discrimination, organized crime, and climate change), obstacles on the migration trail (dangerous 
routes, discrimination, organized crime, and coyotes), and finally family unification in the 
destination country.  
The decision to migrate is a complex one. Families, either subconsciously or openly, 
weigh the benefits and costs of migration which is of particular importance when the livelihoods 
of their children are at stake. Migration must be feasible (permitted by law, facilitated by 
infrastructure) and desirable (information on destination is available, benefits are expected to 
outweigh the costs) in order for families to actually migrate.25 In the case of Central American 
migrants, extensive illegal migration networks and the relative permeability of the United States 
border facilitate the migration process.  
I will use a variety of different sources to conduct my analysis. A combination of 
scholarly articles, think-tank reports, and, most importantly, newspaper coverage provide well-
rounded information on the subject. This chapter examines three major national newspapers in 
Central America—La Prensa in Honduras, La Prensa Libre in Guatemala, and La Prensa 
 
25  Kok, Jan. “The Family Factor in Migration Decisions.” Pg. 248. 
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Gráfica in El Salvador—to explicate the different variables in migration decisions. They reveal 
trends related to family migration as well as nuances unable to be captured within numerical 
analysis.  
Drivers of Migration 
The economic, social, and environmental state of the Northern Triangle encourages 
families to leave in search of a better life elsewhere. Specifically, poverty, extortion, violence, 
gender discrimination and climate change have encouraged migrant families to flee their home 
countries in the Northern Triangle in the past decade.  
Poverty 
The Northern Triangle suffers from high levels of poverty which encourages families to 
migrate in hopes of finding economic security abroad. In 2016, over half of Central America’s 
population lived in poverty, a share that climbs to two-thirds in rural areas.26 Rural communities 
across the region experience this to a severe degree with the three Northern Triangle countries 
suffering from the highest levels of rural poverty in all of Central America at 75% in Honduras, 
54% in Guatemala, and 47% in El Salvador.27 Unsurprisingly, many families seek economic 
opportunity elsewhere given the elevated poverty rates which especially debilitate rural 
communities. Since 2013, Honduras contained the largest percentage of poor households in the 
region where people live with incomes below $1.25 per day.28 The high rates of crime and 
violence in El Salvador dissuade international investors from opening businesses or factories 
creating severe unemployment. El Salvador generates approximately 30,000 jobs per year yet 
40,000 jobs would be required to match the number of workers entering the labor market.29 
 
26 Marrone, Rhonda. “Poverty in Central America: Advancement and Needs.” The Borgen Project, August 1, 2016.  
27 Ibid. 
28 “Pobreza e inseguridad causan migración de hondureños segun estudio.” La Prensa. February 20, 2019.  
29 “The World Bank in El Salvador.” The World Bank, October 10, 2019.  
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Twenty-three percent of Guatemalans believe that fleeing the country is the only way to improve 
their livelihoods and provide for their families, suggesting that one in four Guatemalans cannot 
envision economic improvement unless they emigrate. This statistic fails to capture the “reality 
in remote villages and communities where the only hope is migration,” according to Lucía 
Muñoz, a researcher of rural areas in Guatemala.30 The dire economic situation is manifested in 
high poverty rates and unemployment. These trends explain why many rural families choose to 
journey as a unit to countries with better economic opportunities.  
Violence  
 The Northern Triangle is one of the most violent regions in the world from which 
families flee out of safety concerns. Many families hope to claim asylum abroad since they feel it 
is unsafe for them to remain in their home countries. The United Nations Agency for Refugees 
notes that the number of Central Americans applying for asylum around the world increased 58% 
from 2016 to 2017.31 Many asylum petitioners are women and children, unaccompanied minors, 
or children separated from their parents who are fleeing violence. One migrant describes the 
violence as getting “stronger and harder” thus leaving them no other option.32 On a daily basis in 
the region, people fear being victims of a crime or unintentionally witnessing a crime in the 
streets that turns into a “sentencia de muerte,” a death sentence for them and their family.33  
Even if a Northern Triangle family is victimized by criminal actors, the perpetrators often 
don’t face justice. The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) conducted a series of 
interviews with crime victims in El Salvador and Honduras. They all emphasized the senseless 
and random violence against innocent people. Many crimes against citizens, women, and 
 
30Rodas, Sergio Morales. “La Única Opción de Superarse Es Migrar, Considera 1 de Cada 4 Encuestados.” Prensa 
Libre. August 14, 2019.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 “Violencia alimenta la migración forzada desde Centroamérica.” La Prensa Gráfica. May 23, 2018.  
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families go unpunished due to the lack of “internal accountability, oversight mechanisms, and 
processes to deal with police misconduct or criminal wrongdoing.”34 Criminal groups may bribe 
police to buy their impunity or law enforcement officers may be active members of the gangs. 
When police systems fail to control the violence, Northern Triangle countries have been known 
to deploy their militaries to confront crime. However, military forces are trained in combat rather 
than law enforcement, so their tendency to use force when dealing with crime has an adverse 
effect on decreasing violence. To varying degrees, “the criminal justice systems in these 
countries are fragile, underfunded, and unaccountable.”35 Police, organized crime groups, and 
petty offenses go unaddressed which deeper embeds the role of violence and crime in Northern 
Triangle society. 
The region arguably can be labelled as the most dangerous region in the world for 
women. El Salvador in 2016 held the most dismal statistic in the world in which the murder rate 
per 100,000 women was 10.2. Honduras recorded 5.8 murders per 100,000 in 2016 whereas the 
rate in Guatemala was over two murders per 100,000 in 2017.36 Feminicide, the killing of 
women for gender related reasons, is a severe problem in the Northern Triangle. These 
homicides tend to result from domestic violence, divorce, and verbal altercations. According to 
the secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
“femicide is the most extreme expression of violence against women. Neither the criminal 
classification of this offense nor the efforts to make it statistically visible have been enough to 
eradicate this scourge that alarms and horrifies us on a daily basis.”37 
 
34 Washington Office on Latin America. In Their Own Words: Central Americans Face Violence, Corruption and 
Impunity. Washington DC, 2018. 
35 Ibid. 
36 “At Least 2,795 Women Were Victims of Feminicide in 23 Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in 
2017.” United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, November 15, 2018.  
37 Ibid. 
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In addition to feminicide, women in the Northern Triangle commonly experience sexual 
assault and receive minimal legal support. According to the Observatory of Violence at the 
National Autonomous University of Honduras, at least one woman is murdered every 17 hours 
while many others experience threats, intimidation, and sexual violence.38 Many women, in 
particular young girls, become pregnant after forced sexual encounters with men. In Chiquimula, 
the most populous city in Eastern Guatemala with over 100,000 residents, eighteen women were 
violently killed and over seventy girls ages 10 to 14 became pregnant in the year 2019 alone.39 
Women are often powerless against their aggressors and the legal system rarely supports their 
pleas for fairness under the law. Crimes against women go unpunished given the dynamics of a 
male-dominated society which is complicated by the normalcy of impunity in the Central 
American criminal justice systems. In a place where women can be killed for simply being a 
woman, many Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran women elect to leave to protect their 
dignity and safety.  
Narcotrafficking 
 Drug traffickers, also known as “narcos,” are some the most notorious criminal actors in 
the region. The residual violence and insecurity created by the crossfire of narcotrafficking 
activities makes families want to leave the region. The Northern Triangle geographically 
connects drug producing countries like Colombia and Peru to nations like the United States 
where demand for illegal drugs like cocaine and methamphetamine is high. Cartel-affiliated 
groups in the Northern Triangle act as “transportistas,” the people who oversee the movement of 
these substances across the region.40 To do so unscathed, narcos finance the campaigns of local 
 
38Garcia, David, and Roald Horving. “10 Things You Should Know About Violence in Central America.” 
Norwegian Refugee Council, September 27, 2018.  
39 Stewart, Dony. “Mujeres Exigen Cese de La Violencia Mientras Se Registran 18 Asesinatos y 71 Embarazos En 
Niñas.” La Prensa Libre, November 26, 2019.  
40 Dudley, Steven. “How Drug Trafficking Operates, Corrupts in Central America.” Insight Crime, July 6, 2016. 
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officials and judges to avoid prosecution for their activities. They also kill rivals who sell drugs 
in their territories or infringe upon their transportation routes. Narcotraffickers operate at both 
the international and local levels. Gangs and cartels pay local people to act as contractors who 
sell drugs for them in different neighborhoods as a means of gaining control. It is estimated that 
trafficking in Honduras amounts to $700 million per year, which is 4% of the country’s GDP.41 
The profits are used to buy safe houses, weapons, and the loyalty of politicians to continue their 
lucrative business. The success of the narcos encourages further militarization of society to 
combat the drug trade. However, the ability of the gangs to act with impunity and bribe officials 
“undermines the rule of law and the work to combat drugs in the region, despite the attempts to 
reform the judicial system and apply the law.”42  
Demands of Criminal Groups 
 Extortion, the practice criminal groups use to obtain money through force or threats, is 
intimately linked to poverty and insecurity in the Northern Triangle which encourages families to 
migrate. Paying fees charged by criminal groups, most notoriously the Mara Salvatrucha and 
Barrio 18, ensures that the residents continue to operate their daily lives and businesses 
unharmed. Refusing to pay the fees means countless threats, potential destruction of property, or 
even death. Cartels and local criminal groups dominate local economies and territories in the 
Northern Triangle through this practice but “it is impossible to know the exact statistics of 
extortion” because “there are countless extortions that are hidden due to the panic of those 
affected to denounce it, which could lead to death.”43 The sums expected by criminal groups 
often exceed citizens ability to pay. Many members of organized crime enter the criminal market 
 
 
41 Ibid.  
42 EFE. “El Narcotráfico Hunde a Centroamérica En La Violencia y La Corrupción.” La Prensa, March 2, 2016.  
43 “Imperios de la extorsión están en Honduras y El Salvador.” La Prensa, June 30, 2015.  
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out of desperation for higher wages, but their criminal activity furthers the cycle of economic 
depravity in the region. 
Due to such high demands by cartels and local criminal groups, many Northern Triangle 
residents are forced to flee to less violent countries where payments to criminal groups are not 
required to conduct business or freely live one’s life. The small business sector in El Salvador 
paid upwards of $30 million in rent each month and up to ten businesses were forced to close 
each week as a result of extortion. In over a two-year period in Honduras, at least 18,000 
businesses had to close because they could no longer afford the “impuesto de guerra” or the “war 
tax” imposed on them by criminal actors. In 2015, it was calculated that gangs alone in Honduras 
received upwards of $54 million each year from this “tax.” In Guatemala, it is estimated that 
citizens pay up to $61 million annually in extortion fees.44 Extortion proves a threat not only to 
economic stability but also to physical security if a resident refuses to pay. The necessity to pay 
for one’s own safety in the Northern Triangle incentivizes families to emigrate to countries 
where their freedom is not determined by criminal actors.   
Climate Change 
 Climate change emerges as an increasingly important driver of migration in recent years. 
Prolonged droughts limit crop harvests and result in reduced wages and unemployment for 
families who depend on agriculture to survive. The Northern Triangle falls within the Central 
American Dry Corridor, a tropical dry forest in Western Central America that is one of the 
world’s most vulnerable regions to climate change. Rising atmospheric temperatures in recent 
decades provoked a drought in the corridor which began in 2014. As of September 19, 2019, 
Honduras had not seen rain in ten months. Migration is not only influenced by the “heat and lack 
 
44Ibid. 
 22 
of water which will affect agriculture,” but also “increased sea levels could make some coastal 
areas uninhabitable.”45 Those dependent on the rain to sustain their livelihood are often forced to 
look for a new home or a new way of life to provide for themselves and their families.  
While all agricultural productivity suffers at the hands of climate change, some crops are 
particularly affected. It is predicted that “the change and variability of climate will significantly 
affect the production of corn and beans in Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and to a lesser 
degree Guatemala” thus resulting in economic losses especially for rural farmers.46 Coffee, an 
integral crop for farmers in the Northern Triangle, is very susceptible to changes in climate. In 
the past ten years, more than 60% of coffee farmers in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Mexico 
reported food insecurity during the harvest. One migrant en route to the United States who 
formerly worked on a coffee farm described how “each time there was less harvest and due to 
the drop in prices I was fired.”47 Even though climate change affects populations worldwide, the 
Northern Triangle farmers’ dependence on the natural world for income and basic well-being has 
created a new phenomenon: climate refugees.   
The Migration Journey 
 A family must consider whether their current economic and social situation justifies 
migration and whether they can endure the hardships of the journey. Migrants then must secure a 
way to their destination country, but the process is grueling. Northern Triangle families choose to 
subject themselves and their children to dangerous routes, discrimination, organized crime, and 
human smugglers. They travel by walking on foot, riding on the tops of gang-ridden trains, 
cramming into cars with customized compartments, or hiring a professional smuggler to lead 
 
45 BBC News Mundo. “Cambio Climático: La Razón Por La Que Se Prevé Migrarán Milliones de Centroamérica.” 
La Prensa Libre, September 23, 2019.  
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid.  
 23 
them across borders. The journey is so gruesome that in 2016 alone, over 700 migrants were 
found dead on the journey heading north through Central America.48 Even if a migrant family 
successfully arrives at an international border, the difficulty to achieve legal status abroad 
encourages many to cross into the destination country illegally. For example, the United States 
asylum process requires months or even years to receive a decision, and the backlog of recent 
migrant cases delays the process even more. These factors ought to dissuade migrant families 
from coming, yet the grim conditions in the region allow some families to justify the risk.   
Dangerous Conditions  
 The physical conditions of the journey are extremely taxing. The trek through the desert 
and across the river has always been dangerous, but increased enforcement efforts by the Trump 
administration and Mexican government have forced migrants to take more remote, clandestine 
routes to avoid detection. The risks of migration activities has increased dramatically with 
families “following more dangerous routes to the United States and paying more money to 
human traffickers.”49 Migrants arrive “hurt and tired due to longer routes” and often “dehydrated 
and with viral infections.”50 One migrant claimed that the enforcement actions taken the both the 
President of the United States, Donald Trump, and the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador, have only “stirred the wasps nest causing more damage, more deaths.”51 
Knowing the risks immigrants, particularly those travelling with children, face on the journey 
and the increased danger in recent years is fundamental to understanding the migration decisions 
of families.  
Discrimination and Vulnerability  
 
48 EFE. “El Infierno En El Triángulo Norte de Centroamérica.” La Prensa Libre, June 14, 2017.  
49“Migrantes Hondureños Toman Más Riesgos En México En Su Ruta a EEUU.” La Prensa, July 30, 2019.  
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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Central American migrants face discrimination, threats, and exploitation when they travel 
to their destination. Families must decide whether the inequalities faced at home merit 
experiencing more animosity while on the journey. Fieldwork conducted in migrant shelters 
located in strategic spots on the journey to the United States speaks to the commodification of 
migrants. The migrant flow from the Triangle has become so steady that a term known as the  
“cachuco industry,” cachuco roughly translating to “dirty pig,” has emerged.52  The “cachucos” 
are blamed for Mexico’s social problems and viewed with the utmost skepticism. Migrants are 
targeted with slurs and rarely receive any sympathy. The violence they experience on the journey 
arguably mimics the violence of their everyday lives in the Northern Triangle. In Mexico, 
migrants “are equated with drugs, weapons, terrorists, and gangs thus becoming targets of state 
violence.”53 Throughout the entire trip, those passing through are constructed as “unwanted 
criminals and racialized and gendered others.”54 
The collective discrimination against Central American immigrants in Mexico includes 
cooperation between cartels and law enforcement. Different criminal groups “organize together 
with the police and they carry weapons, heavy artillery. The same police who denounce them are 
the ones who protect them.”55 Police are paid off by organized crime yet claim to enforce the rule 
of law. They either assist in criminal activities directly by acting as spies and helping move cartel 
cargo, or they indirectly allow their illegal activities to continue unscathed and with immunity. 
Vulnerable migrants serve as people to smuggle, bodies to sell for profit, and cheap labor to 
capitalize on. They are seen by criminal groups through the lens of profitability rather than 
humanity thus making the journey psychologically taxing and oftentimes violent. Migrants leave 
 
52 Vogt, Wendy. “Crossing Mexico: Structural Violence and the Commodification…” 765.  
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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one society in which they feel unsafe and unprotected yet enter another with a similar situation. 
This trade suggests that the promise of life elsewhere or simply the prospect of escaping the 
Northern Triangle overcomes the fears of discrimination and vulnerability while travelling.  
Organized Crime 
 The vulnerability of migrants makes them an easy target for organized crime. The covert 
routes to transport migrants to the United States are also those often used by criminal actors in 
their smuggling activities thus increasing contact between the two groups. The train from Central 
America to Mexico, also called “La Bestia,” or “The Beast,” serves as a particularly defenseless 
space for travelers. Oftentimes mass kidnappings are “systematic operations coordinated by train 
conductors, heavily armed organized criminals, and Mexican authorities in remote areas. Local 
residents and even other migrants may be useful in such operations.”56 For many, the last step of 
the journey is navigating the Rio Grande river. One migrant claimed that cartels are “the owners 
of the river and nobody can cross them without paying a large portion to the narcotraffickers.”57 
After paying the fee to cross the river, migrants still are at risk of drowning or discovery from 
border officials while the cartels watch from boats or from the shore. This is a coordinated effort 
amongst different facets of Mexican society in order to profit off of Central American migrants.  
The presence of well-organized and powerful crime groups increases the risk for migrants 
and their families. Migration from the Northern Triangle is considered a “mina de oro” or “gold 
mine” for criminal actors.58 In 2010, there were 11,000 incidents of kidnapping and 214 cases of 
mass kidnappings of migrants in Mexico.59 Some migrants upon capture are even sold into sex 
and labor trafficking or fall victim to organ trafficking. In Tamaulipas, a state known for its 
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ample cartel activity, “a migrant cannot walk through the streets without being assaulted, 
harassed, kidnapped, or violated, all the time they have to stay in shelters.”60 The Zetas are 
particularly feared by migrants in Mexico given their history of kidnappings and executions. 
Perhaps the most shocking Zeta display of brutality and violence occurred in August of 2010 in 
which 72 migrants were murdered (58 men, 14 women).  
Human Smugglers: “Coyotes”  
Professional smugglers who are paid to transport migrants through cartel-controlled 
territories and across international borders are known in Mexico and Central America as 
“coyotes.” Good coyotes with high success rates earn hefty profits and are sought after by 
government officials to help stem the migration flow. It is estimated that migrants pay smugglers 
between $3,500 and $7,000 per person whether they are affiliated with organized crime or not. 
This lucrative migration market brings in an estimated $6 billion per year according to the 
Mexican government.61 Many of these payments are done in vain as coyotes oftentimes deceive, 
assault, or even kill the migrants they promised to deliver. One personal testimony says that 
migrants “do not care about the risks of being kidnapped, extorted, or deported because the 
nightmare of poverty pushes them to undertake the journey and risk everything.62 The treatment 
of migrants by coyotes is perhaps one of the most heartless aspects of the migration journey. 
Coyotes view migrants as “commodities, the faster they can get rid of them, the better,” so they 
utilize a variety of means like buses, vans, boats and safe houses to transport them quickly.63  
 
60Coronado, Eddy. “Niño Guatemalteco Secuestrado Por ‘Los Zetas’ En México Se Reencuentra Con Familiares.” 
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Migrant children present an interesting case. Smugglers often charge less to transport 
children than they do with adults. Families can also be “arrested” by US Customs and Border 
Patrol, detained at the border, and released relatively quickly into the United States when 
compared to a single adult. By getting a family to the US border undetected by Mexican 
officials, the coyote avoids actually crossing the border and facing detection. According to 
American immigration laws, families ought to be released from detention and border processing 
centers after only 20 days (though the recent influx of migrant families has delayed this process). 
From there, migrant parents and their children can disappear into normal life in the United States 
to await their court hearing.64 There are even reports of single migrants who purchase children 
who have been kidnapped from their parents by smugglers as a ticket for expedited release into 
the United States. Some families who cannot leave as a unit even offer up their children to 
extended family or friends to increase their odds of obtaining a better life in the US. Not all 
Northern Triangle families choose to take their chances with coyotes or the American 
immigration system, but it is certainly a consideration for many. 
Family Reunification 
 Many migrant families flee to other countries to reunite with family members who left 
before them and established a life abroad. According to the International Organization on 
Migration, one of the top three reasons for migration in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras is 
family reunification.65 The Inter-American Development Bank conducted a similar study in 
which over 40% of the Northern Triangle migrants surveyed reported reuniting with family as 
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65 “Salvadoreños se van a Otros Países Por Temas Económicos, Reunificación Familiar y Violencia, Dice La OIM.” 
La Prensa Gráfica, May 8, 2018.  
 28 
one of the main reasons for leaving central America.66 It is difficult to estimate the number of 
migrants with family in the United States because many immigrants from the region have entered 
illegally and incoming families fear that reporting the location of a loved one could lead to their 
deportation. Nonetheless, the promise of family reunification draws many Central American 
families to leave their home countries. Northern Triangle migrants often leave family behind in 
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, but for some, saying goodbye to one set of family brings 
with it the opportunity to rejoin another.  
Conclusions 
 After outlining the dangers in the Northern Triangle, this chapter helps validate many 
migrant families’ claims for leaving. Years after civil wars and political conflicts, these countries 
continue to struggle. Economic opportunity is threatened from many different sides. The rural 
regions bear the brunt of high poverty rates where residents live on just a few dollars per day. 
Those who are employed or operate a business often fall victim to paying excessive dues or 
commissions to organized crime groups. The inability to pay those dues may force the business 
to close thus increasing unemployment in the region. Using intimidation and threats to establish 
control, criminal actors dominate local economies and produce some of the highest crime rates in 
the world. They bribe local officials to work for them, so oftentimes reporting a crime poses 
worse consequences than remaining silent. The lack of justice allows men to exploit women in 
Northern Triangle communities spurring them to fear for their safety in their own homes. On top 
of it all, climate change wreaks havoc on these agrarian countries putting many out of work.  
 
66 Inter-American Development Bank. “IDB Study Offers Overview of the Central America’s Migration to the U.S.” 
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The struggles only continue once a family packs their bags. On the migrant trail, many 
Central Americans face discrimination and abuse by those who they encounter along the way. 
Organized crime profits off of the vulnerability of those fleeing and created a lucrative business 
smuggling migrants and their family members across the border. These factors should deter 
migrant families from risking their lives to leave their home countries yet the increasing number 
of families pouring out of the Northern Triangle suggests otherwise.    
In the next chapter, we will see large numbers of respondents who intend to migrate 
along with their different characteristics such as their age and education level among other 
variables. But those who answered the survey and intend to migrate are more than just a number. 
This chapter shows that they are soybean farmers who lost their jobs in a drought but have three 
daughters. They are pregnant women whose partner abused them. They are young parents who 
considered escaping the violence in their neighborhoods that doesn’t allow their children to play 
outside. They are mothers and fathers. This chapter tells the detailed story of why a family may 
leave everything in search of something more.  
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CHAPTER THREE: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
This chapter focuses on how family migration has changed in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Honduras between 2012 and 2018. The best place to track family migration patterns from the 
Northern Triangle is the US-Mexico border because the trends are well-documented and highly 
visible. The number of family units apprehended at the southern border was around 10,000 in 
2012 (dominated by Mexican nationals) thus serving as a base year before the spike in Northern 
Triangle family migration had occurred. In 2014, the overall number of migrant families 
apprehended at the US-Mexico border increased to over five times the number in 2012 with the 
quantity of families coming from the Northern Triangle rising sharply and the amount coming 
from Mexico shrinking. The year 2018 offers a stark contrast to the patterns reported in 2012. 
Over 100,000 family units were apprehended at the border almost exclusively from the Northern 
Triangle countries. These six years saw a tenfold increase in the number of immigrant families 
coming to the United States’ border and a complete shift in in family migration patterns from 
principally Mexican families in 2012 to nearly all Northern Triangle families in 2018.  
Studying Family Units 
To conduct my analysis, I will be using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey for the 
Northern Triangle countries to study how the aforementioned family migration patterns have 
changed from 2012 to 2018. Its consistency and renown as one of the most expansive surveys in 
the region encouraged me to select the LAPOP AmericasBarometer to address the question of 
family migration. The survey covers public opinion and behavior of voting-age adults in North 
America, South America, and the Caribbean. LAPOP surveys respondents on a wide array of 
subjects, employs a consistent questionnaire across countries, and uses samples that are 
representative of each population making it ideal for cross-country analysis.  
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I created a proxy for families within the available data because the survey is not designed 
to study family units specifically. I restricted the sample to only include cases where respondents 
answer one or more to question 12BN: “How many children under the age of 13 live in this 
house?” thus limiting the survey to parents or guardians of children. Implicit in narrowing the 
sample this way are two key considerations. First, men or women who have children consider 
their parental status or guardianship when making migration decisions. Migration of a mother, 
father, or entire family drastically affects the safety, social fabric, and economic stability of a 
family unit which a parent considers when contemplating migration. Second, limiting the sample 
to families with relatively young children (under the age of 13) helps capture the Latin American 
family dynamic. Children under 13 are typically dependent on their parental figures, are less self-
sufficient than older minors, and are likely not capable of making their own migration decisions. 
I originally intended to maximize my sample size by limiting the study to respondents with 
children of all ages (those who answered “yes” to Question 12: “Do you have children?”), but 
the question was not included in the LAPOP questionnaires for both years of study.  
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable for this study is a migrant’s self-declared intention to migrate 
within the next couple years. Intentions to migrate are measured by question 14 in the LAPOP 
AmericasBarometer survey: “Do you have intentions of leaving to live or work in another 
country in the next three years?”.67 The respondents answer either (1) Yes, (2) No, (888888) 
Don’t know, and (98888) No answer. Respondents who claimed “Don’t know” and “No answer” 
were excluded from the analysis.  
 
67 The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org. 
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 Question 14 represented the most applicable migration question in the survey by asking 
respondents whether they “intend” to migrate within the next three years. Under this framework, 
it is impossible to connect migration intentions with migration behavior thus inherently limiting 
the scope of the analysis. Declaring intentions to migrate represents an important step in the 
process but does not indicate that a respondent actually decides to migrate. Not all respondents 
who answer affirmative to intentions of leaving may actually do so, and in the same way, not all 
respondents who reject having intentions to migrate will maintain that opinion. The lack of an 
equally comprehensive database that included data on migration behavior encouraged me to 
pursue the research project using this question and this database.  
Independent Variables 
 The independent variables for this study include both demographic variables as well as 
migration specific variables such as crime victimization, social connections abroad, and 
economic situation which are intimately connected with the study of migration specifically. As 
we saw in Chapter 2, high crime rates, the prospect of reconnecting with family abroad, and 
minimal economic opportunities are all widely cited reasons for migration from Central 
America. This chapter will analyze them in greater detail along with demographic variables such 
as age, gender, household location, and years of education. In total, the quantitative section 
investigates eight independent variables which include 22 total values and their connection with 
answering affirmative to intentions to migrate. The variables were selected based on their 
relevance to the dependent variable: intentions to migrate. Each variable is outlined below:  
Crime Victimization: Crime Victimization is pertinent to the analysis because the 
Northern Triangle maintains high crime rates and widespread organized crime. The fear 
instilled by crime incentives families to migrate. Crime victimization is a binary variable 
with respondents answering (1) Yes or (2) No to question VIC1EXT: “Have you been a 
victim of crime in the past 12 months?”.  
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Remittances: In addition to crime, if Northern Triangle residents answer affirmative to 
receiving foreign economic assistance, they may be encouraged to migrate and/or reunite 
with family members abroad. I use question 10A, “Do you or someone else in your 
household receive remittances?”, to measure the existence of social connections abroad in 
which respondents answer either (1) Yes or (2) No.  
 
Age: The different age groups of the parents migrating (which implies different age 
groups of children) may vary across years and pose different implications. I divided age, 
a numerical variable measured by question 2: “How old are you?”, into four categories. 
Each category represents a ten year increment to capture a different stage of parenthood. 
The first value, (1) 18-27 of age, is intended to capture parents with young children. The 
second value, (2) 28-37 years of age, reflects moderately young parents with children 
from of all ages. The third value, (3) 38-47 years of age, represents parents likely to have 
older children while the fourth value, (4) 48+ years of age, is intended to capture the 
grandparent generation though unlikely that they may make the journey.  
 
Gender:  Gender is another important variable in the analysis because rampant gender 
inequality may have different effects on the migration decisions of males when compared 
to females. The survey defines gender as a binary variable, dividing the population into 
(1) male and (2) female, and is determined by the interviewer upon introduction 
(Question 1: Sex).  
 
Education: With regards to years of schooling, different education levels may 
disproportionately affect migration patterns of families which is why it is included.  I 
transformed education status, a numerical variable based on number of years of schooling 
completed. I divided education into three categorical values: (1) 0-5 years of education, 
to represent zero to some completion of primary school, (2) 6-11 years of schooling, to 
represent completion of primary school and zero to some completion of secondary 
school, and (3) 12+ years of schooling, to represent the completion of primary, 
secondary, and zero to some higher education.  
 
Household Economic Status: Poverty in the region is widespread, so a migrant family’s 
assessment of their household income may encourage them to leave or stay. I selected 
question 10D to address a household’s income. The question asks respondents to choose 
the category which best describes their attitude towards their household’s income 
according to the following criteria: (1) “it is good enough for you and you can save from 
it,” (2) “it is just enough for you and you don’t have major problems,” (3) “it is not 
enough for you and you are stretched,” and (4) “it is not enough for you and you are 
having a hard time.” 
 
Household Location: Additionally, the day to day life of rural households is radically 
different from that of urban households. The inequalities and vulnerabilities of rural 
families may encourage their migration decisions to differ from those of urban families. 
The type of household the respondent lives in is classified as a binary variable, “ (1) 
rural” and “ (2) urban,” and determined by the interviewer upon arrival.  
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Employment Status: Lastly, a migrant’s employment status which is directly connected to 
their ability to provide for their families is considered when determining whether to 
migrate or not. I transformed the values for employment status of the respondent into five 
categories: (1) Employed, (2) Unemployed, (3) Student, (4) Taking care of the home, and 
(5) Retired, a pensioner, or permanently disabled to work.  
 
Analysis Part One: Crosstabs 
 The crosstabs summarize the proportion of respondents who fall within each category 
listed above for the dependent variable intentions to migrate. I ran crosstabs in SPSS for each of 
my independent variables in order to observe how the composition of migrant families has 
changed from 2012 to 2018 for the three Northern Triangle countries. The percentage values in 
the tables below represent the proportion of respondents who answered affirmative to having 
intentions to migrate while also answering affirmative to or identifying as the indicated value in 
the leftmost column. While crosstabs cannot indicate any level of correlation or causality as it 
does not control for other factors, it is a valuable tool to track shifting dynamics of respondents 
who have children with declared intentions to migrate, my proxy for family units. See Table 1 in 
the Appendix for the full results.  
 
Crosstabs Analysis: 
 The tables below show the percentage change for each independent variable’s values for 
each country from 2012 to 2018. The number of respondents who report intentions to migrate 
increased dramatically between the two years (146 to 236 in El Salvador, 88 to 299 in 
Guatemala, and 69 to 439 in Honduras). This corresponds with documented migration numbers 
and is relevant when comparing the percentages across years. The difference was taken between 
the percentages of 2018 and 2012 to provide the clearest indication of patterns within the region 
for comparison. The results are outlined below: 
Crime Victimization 
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 Honduras Guatemala El Salvador 
Victim of Crime -8.6%  -8% +2.6% 
Table 2.a: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages of crime 
victims between 2012 and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. 
 
 These results suggest that there are fewer migrants who are influenced by crime 
victimization in Honduras and Guatemala. The number of respondents who expressed intentions 
to migrate decreased by over 8% for those two countries. The positive percentage in El Salvador 
suggests either a worsening of the crime situation or crime victimization as a variable becoming 
more connected to migration decision given more crime victims want to leave. Crime is a 
prominent issue within the Northern Triangle, but these numbers suggest that the number of 
crime victims declaring intentions to migrate is either decreasing or growing slightly.  
Remittances 
 Honduras Guatemala El Salvador 
Recipient of 
Remittances 
+1% -2.8% +2.1% 
Table 2.b: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages between 
remittance-receiving migrants from 2012 and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. 
 
Remittance-receiving migrants with self-proclaimed intentions of migrating saw minimal 
changes across all three groups. Percentages increased slightly in Honduras and El Salvador but 
decreased slightly for Guatemala. These results suggest that remittance levels for respondents 
with intentions to migrate remained relatively constant given how close the percentages are to 
zero. These numbers indicate that there was either little change in the number of migrants who 
received remittances between the two years or those who receive remittances haven’t changed 
their opinions on migrating.  
Age 
 Honduras Guatemala El Salvador 
Age 18-27 years +1.3% +14.1% +14.1% 
Age 28-37 years -6.5% -9.8% -17.6% 
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Age 38-47 years +0.4% -2.5% -1.8% 
Age 48+ years +4.8% -1.7% +5.2% 
Table 2.c: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages between age 
groups from 2012 and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. 
 
There is somewhat of a polarization trend occurring in which both the youngest and 
oldest age brackets saw increases in intentions to migrate. The youngest age group with 
respondents age 18-27, designed to capture parents with young children, saw growth across all 
three countries implying an increase in younger parents with younger children migrating. The 
percentages climb to over 14% in both Guatemala and El Salvador suggesting that the migrants 
coming from those countries should be notably younger than in the past. There is a decrease in 
the second age group for all three countries and minimal change in the third group. For Honduras 
and El Salvador, there is an increase in the oldest age bracket of migrants suggesting that middle-
aged parents may be migrating with older children.  
Gender 
 Honduras Guatemala El Salvador 
Men +12.4% -5% -1.6% 
Women -12.4% +5% +1.6% 
Table 2.d: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages between 
genders from 2012 and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. 
 
Gender differences proved very inconsistent with a large decrease in women declaring 
intentions to migrate in Honduras while smaller positive changes occurred for Guatemala and El 
Salvador. It is expected from these results that there would be disproportionately more Honduran 
fathers migrating from the region yet slightly more Guatemalan and Salvadoran mothers.  
Education 
 Honduras Guatemala El Salvador 
0-5 years of 
education 
-5.7% +8.4% -5.2% 
6-11 years of 
education 
-3.5% +6.3% +1.4% 
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12+ years of 
education 
+9.1% -2% +3.7% 
Table 2.e: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages in years of 
education from 2012 and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. 
 
Education levels of those surveyed with intentions to migrate also proved inconsistent.  
Honduran respondents reported a larger increase in people pursuing higher education with 
intentions to migrate and a decrease in the more uneducated populations. Guatemalan responses 
indicate an increase in relatively uneducated migrants and those who completed primary and 
some secondary education. The percentages of people who completed primary and some 
secondary education along with those pursuing higher education also increased for El Salvadoran 
respondents.   
Household Economic Status 
 Honduras Guatemala El Salvador 
Salary is Good 
Enough 
-11.2% +5.7% +5.1% 
Salary is Just Enough -18.9% +3% +2.2% 
Salary is Not 
Enough/Stretched 
+6.6% -12.6% -4% 
Salary is Not 
Enough/Having a 
Hard Time 
+23.6% +12.6% -3.3% 
Table 2.f: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages between 
migrants of different income brackets from 2012 and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. 
 
These results present change in each area of the spectrum. In Honduras, members of the 
poorest income bracket (those whose salary is not enough, and they are having a hard time) who 
express migration intentions increase dramatically, the the largest change of any value. The 
second poorest group also expresses increased intentions to migrate, but the highest income 
brackets express decreased intentions to migrate by a large margin. Guatemala presents a 
peculiar situation in which all groups indicate increased intentions to migrate except the 
stretched salary respondents. Increased intentions to migrate for the fringe salary groups could be 
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indicative of increased indigenous migration (who are generally are of low socioeconomic status) 
and growing migration of upper classes (those with adequate resources to migrate). El Salvador’s 
patterns are opposite of those in Honduras. Salvadoran respondents of the higher income 
brackets express and increased willingness to migrate whereas those of lower income reveal 
decreased intentions to migrate. There is an across the board increase in at least two income 
groups expressing intentions to migrate, but the groups vary from country to country.  
Household Location 
 Honduras Guatemala El Salvador 
Urban -6.9% -3.8% -4.2% 
Rural +6.9% +3.8% +4.2% 
Table 2.g: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages between 
migrants urban and rural status from 2012 and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. 
 
Urban residents with declared intentions to migration decreased and rural residents with 
intentions to migrate increased by the same amount for all three Northern Triangle countries. 
This is one of the only uniform results across all three countries and implies that there should be 
an observed increase in migrants from rural areas.  
Employment Status 
 Honduras Guatemala El Salvador 
Employed -9.6% -22.4% -11.2% 
Unemployed +12.9% +12.6% +11.3% 
Student -0.2% +4.6% +6.1% 
Caring for the Home -3.5% +4.9% -7.8% 
Retired +0.9% +0.3% +1.7% 
Table 2.h: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages between 
migrants of different employment status from 2012 and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. 
 
Lastly, all three countries witnessed a decline of employed respondents with intentions to 
migrate and an increase in unemployed migrates with intentions to migrate. Using the same logic 
as household location, this should imply an empirical increase in unemployed migrant families 
leaving the country as opposed to employed ones.  
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Conclusions 
This section answers the first part of the research question regarding how family 
migration from the Northern Triangle has changed over time. The results indicate that migrants 
as members of families in 2018 tend to belong to the fringe age groups (Ages 18-27 or 48+), to 
be unemployed, and to reside rural areas in contrast with 2012. This has implications for both 
destination and home countries. The young migrant families arriving are likely desperately in 
need of work to provide for their children and may possess less work experience than migrants of 
the older age groups. Northern Triangle countries may see an emptying of the rural areas in 
recent years because migrants from those areas have expressed increased intentions to migrate. 
This analysis is also important in showing the variation between countries. Honduras, 
Guatemala, and El Salvador are often referenced as a collective unit under the title “Northern 
Triangle Countries” but in fact the composition of migrant families coming from the region are 
quite different with the exception of a few key variables according to this analysis.  
Analysis Part 2: Logistic Regression  
 The regression analysis will allow us to test correlations between the independent 
variables and intentions to migrate. The logistic regression implemented in the second half of 
this chapter will speak to the relationship between the dependent variable and four independent 
variables of study: crime victimization, perceived economic situation, household location, and 
gender. The strength of the relationship between these key variables helps answer how migration 
patterns have changed in the past decade.   
Hypotheses  
1) Crime victimization, household location and gender will be more related to intentions to 
migrate in 2018 than in 2012.  
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I hypothesize that crime victimization has become more important for migration 
decisions of families from 2012 to 2018 thus helping explain the massive influx of families 
emigrating from the Northern Triangle. Many factors disproportionately affect rural families as 
opposed to urban ones. I suggest this discrepancy could have encouraged the shift between 2012 
and 2018. I also hypothesize that gender has become increasingly related to migration decisions 
given the shift in trends to family units as opposed to single adults.  
2) Household economic situation will be less related to intentions to migrate in 2018 than in 
2012.  
I also hypothesize that household economic situation, a common predicter of migration 
trends, has become less connected to family migration decisions relative to crime victimization, 
household location, and gender since 2012. The increased number of asylum seekers in recent 
years, for which economic insecurity is not a qualification, leads me to place more weight on 
other variables to explain the shift in migration patterns.  
Regression Analysis Methodology and Results 
In order to determine the variables most closely connected to family migration for each 
year, I ran a binary logistic regression in SPSS for the three countries for using all eight 
independent variables as covariates and intentions to migrate as the dependent variable. The 
equation for the logistic regression is as follows: Logged odds (intention to emigrate) = beta_0 + 
beta_1*(crime victimization) + beta_2*(recipient of remittances) + beta_3*age + beta_4*female 
+ beta_5*education + beta_6*salary + beta_7*urban + beta_8*employment. In order to calculate 
the percentage change in odds, which allows us to see how the probability of migration increases 
or decreases based on the relationship with the independent variable, I subtracted 1 from the 
logged odds and multiplied the result by 100 as follows: (Exp(B) – 1) * 100 = percentage change 
in odds.  
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The p-value measures whether we can say with certainly that a relationship exists or not 
between the dependent variable and the independent variables. The confidence with which we 
can confirm this relationship will be indicated by the number of asterisks. The lack of an asterisk 
means that the relationship between the two variables is not statistically significant. The 
percentage change in odds measures the magnitude and direction of that relationship (positive or 
negative) between the two. I compared the statistical significance across years to analyze 
changes in the relationship across time and used the odds ratio (Exp(B)) to see how much the 
odds of migration change as a result of each unit change in the four independent variables of 
focus. The results are outlined below: 
Crime Victimization 
 Regression 
Coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
Error 
(S.E.) 
Logged 
Odds 
(exp(B)) 
Numbe
r of 
Cases  
Cox-Snell 
R-Squared 
Nagelkerke 
R-Squared 
Honduras 2012 0.700** 0.301 2.014 700 0.078 0.157 
Honduras 2018 0.269 0.169 1.308 1069 0.108 0.147 
Guatemala 2012 0.636** 0.270 1.888 694 0.082 0.155 
Guatemala 2018 0.592*** 0.178 1.807 993 0.077 0.111 
El Salvador 2012 0.443 0.250 1.558 597 0.978 0.117 
El Salvador 2018 0.722*** 0.198 2.059 773 0.090 0.129 
*statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval 
**statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval  
*** statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval 
Table 3.a: This table shows the p-value and logged odds results of the binary logistic regression analysis for crime 
victimization (P values labelled as 0.000 mean that the value was less than 0.001 and therefore was rounded down)  
 
The crime victimization variable is a way to measure the effects of organized crime and 
everyday violence mentioned in chapter 2 on the migration intentions of families. According to 
the regression results, crime victimization becomes more strongly related to intentions to migrate 
in Guatemala and El Salvador but less related in Honduras between 2012 and 2018. Crime 
victimization was statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval in Honduras in 2012 but 
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was not significant in 2018 which suggests a weakening in the relationship between crime 
victimization and migration over time. The results show that crime victimization in El Salvador 
became increasingly related to migration decisions from 2012 to 2018. Crime victimization was 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval for 2018 whereas it was not statistically 
significant at all in 2012.  
The direction of the relationship between crime victimization and is not what I 
anticipated. If a Salvadoran respondent answered “no” to having intentions to migrate, their 
logged odds of migrating in 2018 increased by over 100%. The logged odds of migrating in 
Guatemala decreases from 88% in 2012 to 80% in 2018 when shifting from category (1) being a 
victim of a crime to (2) not being a victim of a crime between the years. Overall, crime 
victimization is related to migration decisions but decreases the probability of migrating in 
Guatemala and El Salvador in 2018 which was unexpected. To explain this discrepancy, there 
must be a characteristic of crime victims, such as lower economic status or location in a rural 
community, which discourages families from intending to migrate. 
Gender 
 Regression 
Coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
Error 
(S.E.) 
Logged 
Odds 
(exp(B)) 
Number 
of Cases  
Cox-Snell 
R-Squared 
Nagelkerke 
R-Squared 
Honduras 2012 -0.178 0.332 0.837 700 0.078 0.157 
Honduras 2018 0.430*** 0.158 1.537 1069 0.108 0.147 
Guatemala 2012 0.559** 0.278 1.749 694 0.082 0.155 
Guatemala 2018 0.537*** 0.167 1.710 993 0.077 0.111 
El Salvador 2012 0.380 0.259 1.462 597 0.978 0.117 
El Salvador 2018 0.337* 0.194 1.401 773 0.090 0.129 
Table 3.b: This table shows the p-value and logged odds results of the binary logistic regression analysis for gender.  
 
Gender’s relationship with migration can be indicative of how women are treated within 
a society. If they express increased intentions to migrate, it could suggest that the social and 
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economic opportunities for woman are not satisfactory. Gender became more closely related to 
intentions to migrate in 2018 when compared with 2012. Gender was not statistically significant 
in Honduras and El Salvador in 2012 but became statistically significant in 2018 suggesting that 
the relationship between gender and intentions to migrate has increased over time. Gender is 
statistically significant in Guatemala for both 2012 and 2018 suggesting a relationship has 
existed between the two variables over time. 
The results indicate with certainty that women were much more likely to intend to 
migrate than men in 2018. In 2018, being a woman increased the logged odds of migrating by 
53% in Honduras. In El Salvador in 2018, being a female increased the logged odds of migrating 
by 40%. The logged odds of female migration over those six years in Guatemala slightly 
decreases from 74% to 71% but is still positive. Overall, females, who in this case are mothers or 
guardians of children given the sample parameters, express increased intentions to migrate in 
2018 as opposed to 2012 and are more likely to migrate than men.  
Household Economic Situation 
 Regression 
Coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
Error 
(S.E.) 
Logged 
Odds 
(exp(B)) 
Number 
of Cases  
Cox-Snell 
R-Squared 
Nagelkerke 
R-Squared 
Honduras 2012 -0.090 0.172 0.914 700 0.078 0.157 
Honduras 2018 -0.481*** 0.085 0.618 1069 0.108 0.147 
Guatemala 2012 -0.498*** 0.177 0.608 694 0.082 0.155 
Guatemala 2018 -0.261*** 0.095 0.770 993 0.077 0.111 
El Salvador 2012 -0.566*** 0.138 0.568 597 0.978 0.117 
El Salvador 2018 -0.245** 0.104 0.783 773 0.090 0.129 
Table 3.c: This table shows the p-value and logged odds results of the binary logistic regression analysis for 
household’s economic status. 
 
The household economic status results represent the income distribution amongst those 
families with intentions to migrate. Contrary to the hypothesis which suggests a decreased 
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relationship with income and migration, household economic situation was related to intentions 
to migrate across both years for Guatemala and El Salvador. These results suggest that there has 
always been a significant relationship between a family’s household income and their intentions 
to migrate in those two countries. In 2012, Honduras was the only country in which household 
economic situation was not explicitly related to intentions to migrate. In 2018, the relationship 
increased since household economic situation was statistically significant at the 99% confidence 
interval.  
Overall, migrant parents of lower economic status tend to report less intentions to migrate 
across both years. As a household reports itself in a lower income bracket in Honduras, the 
probability of migrating for each lower bracket decreases by over 38%. The strength of the 
negative relationship between migration and lower economic status is strong for Guatemala and 
El Salvador as well. As income status decreases, the odds of not intending to migrate decrease 
from 39.2% to 23% in Guatemala and 43.2% to 39.2% in El Salvador. These results suggest that 
lower economic status is not as powerful of a predicter to dissuade families from migrating as it 
was in the past for these two countries. Nonetheless, lower income families still express less 
intentions to migrate than higher income ones.  
Household Location  
 Regression 
Coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
Error 
(S.E.) 
Logged 
Odds 
(exp(B)) 
Number 
of Cases  
Cox-Snell 
R-Squared 
Nagelkerke 
R-Squared 
Honduras 2012 0.232 0.295 1.261 700 0.078 0.157 
Honduras 2018 0.271* 0.140 1.311 1069 0.108 0.147 
Guatemala 2012 -0.247 0.266 0.781 694 0.082 0.155 
Guatemala 2018 -0.317** 0.157 0.728 993 0.077 0.111 
El Salvador 2012 0.372 0.096 1.451 597 0.978 0.117 
El Salvador 2018 0.331* 0.187 1.393 773 0.090 0.129 
 45 
Table 3.d: This table shows the p-value and logged odds results of the binary logistic regression analysis for 
household location.  
 
A household’s location is used to express two different ways of life. Cities tend to be less 
vulnerable to climate change than rural agrarian areas, likely offer better employment 
opportunities, and provide more resources for families. The relationship between household 
location and intentions to migrate increases over time. Rural or urban status was not statistically 
significant in 2012 for any of the three countries. In 2018, an important change occurred, and it 
became statistically significant for all three countries. In Honduras and El Salvador, household 
location was statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval but in Guatemala it was 
significant at the 95% confidence interval.  
In Honduras and El Salvador in 2018, rural migrants became more likely than urban ones 
to express intentions to migrate. Parents or guardians of children who live in a rural area are 
31.1% more likely in Honduras and 39.3% more likely in El Salvador to intend to migrate. For 
Guatemalan respondents, the relationship is negative. Respondents in a rural area are 27.2% less 
likely to migrate when compared to urban ones. This is a large change in both directions for the 
Northern Triangle countries. We should then expect to see a pattern of more urban families 
coming from Guatemala and more rural ones emigrating from Honduras and El Salvador in 
recent years.  
Conclusions 
 Overall, the results partially satisfy the first hypothesis and render the second hypothesis 
incorrect. Crime victimization became more related to migration decisions in El Salvador which 
the hypothesis suggested, less related to migration decisions in Honduras, and remained 
relatively constant in Guatemala. The prevalence of organized crime and its grip on the lives of 
families is likely to be higher in El Salvador (since it has the highest murder rate in the region) 
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which could explain the results. Gender satisfied the hypothesis in which being a female 
increases the odds of migration by over 40% in each country in 2018. These results suggest that 
these countries have not prioritized the well-being of women. If anything, the situation for 
females has worsened. Household location also satisfies the hypothesis for all three countries. 
The predicted direction of the relationship is the same for Honduras and El Salvador in which 
rural status increases the logged odds of migration, but the opposite relationship occurs in 
Guatemala in which the logged odds of migration decrease with rural status. Perhaps the 
situation for rural migrants is more desperate in El Salvador and Honduras, or the rural migrant 
families in Guatemala cannot afford to undertake the journey.  
The second hypothesis regarding a decreasing connection between household economic 
status and intentions to migrate proved to be false. Economic status became more closely 
connected to intentions to migrate in Honduras in 2018 but remained so in Guatemala and El 
Salvador suggesting a relatively constant relationship between the two variables. Interestingly, 
families of lower economic status are less likely to migrate when compared to those in a higher 
income bracket. The sharp increase in asylum seekers coming from the Northern Triangle in 
recent years suggest that violence is an increasingly important reason for intending to migrate. 
This research suggests otherwise. Economic insecurity has consistently been a prominent push 
factor in family migration intentions.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
 
 This thesis analyzes how migration patterns of families in the Northern Triangle of 
Central America changed over time. The qualitative research which included a combination of 
reports and newspaper analyses vividly outlines why a family may desire to migrate. 
Understanding the context for migration decisions in Central America and on the journey to 
another country is fundamental to understanding how and why families choose to leave. While 
the qualitative chapter explained the different variables in detail, the logistic regression analysis 
of the LAPOP data demonstrates which factors relate most to migration intentions of families 
and how that has changed between 2012 and 2018.  
Implications of the Research  
Crime Victimization 
 This research suggests that crime victimization is relatively less influential in intentions 
to migrate than the media and policy experts make it out to be. I initially anticipated that crime 
victimization and the intention to migrate would become more closely related over time which 
would help explain the recent increase families claiming asylum. For El Salvador alone, this 
proved true but not in the way I hypothesized. For a country with the one of the highest homicide 
rates in the world, I expected crime victimization to drastically increase the likelihood of 
migration. On the contrary, the results report that crime victimization actually decreases the odds 
of intending to migrate by over 100% in El Salvador for the year 2018. This suggests that either 
other characteristics weigh heavier in the migration decisions of Salvadorans or potentially that 
something about the population crime victims hinders them from migrating. For example, the 
exploitation of rural families by criminal groups may leave them financially unable to leave.  
In Honduras, crime victimization and intentions to migrate become less connected over 
time which suggests that either other factors emerged to determine the migration decisions of 
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families or that the crime situation has actually improved in recent years. In Honduras in 2012, 
just three years after the coup d’état rocked the country, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime 
reports that the country had the world’s highest murder rate: 90 homicides per 100,000.68 That 
number has fallen by over half in 2018 which indicates improvement in the crime situation.69 If 
this explains the results, it would poses important consequences for policy makers when 
considering the multitude of asylum claims coming from Honduras. For Guatemala, crime 
victimization proved related to migration intentions for both years, but the chances of a non-
crime victim intending to migrate increases 8% between 2012 and 2018. Crime victimization for 
both years decreases the odds of having intentions of migrating by 80% or more. Despite the 
slight increase in non-crime victims intending to leave, crime predominantly decreases a family’s 
likelihood to express migration intentions in Guatemala.  
The crime victimization results suggest that crime has become less connected to 
migration intentions in Honduras and a potent factor in discouraging families from having 
intentions to migrate in the other countries. This could be due to the fact that criminal actors tend 
to target specific groups rather than the entire population. As mentioned in chapter 2, organized 
crime prays on the weakness and vulnerability of those who cannot defend themselves. In a 
survey that is representative of the entire population, the effects of crime victimization will likely 
be understated since the data includes those with political power and economic influence, the 
groups of society who are more immune to the violence of everyday life than disadvantaged 
populations. 
Gender 
 
68 “Which Countries Have the World’s Highest Murder Rates? Honduras Tops the List.” CNN. April 11, 2014. 
69 Labrador and Renwick. “Central America’s Violent Northern Triangle.”  
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 The results of the gender regression are quite consistent with the proposed hypothesis and 
indicate that being a woman greatly increases the odds of intending to migrate. In 2018, gender 
was related to migration intentions for all three countries and woman were 40% more likely to 
declare intentions to migrate than men.  These results imply that a strong connection exists 
between women and migration in recent years which could explain the shift in families leaving. 
It could be inferred that the odds of a mother leaving without her children is slim, especially in 
the case of divorce, domestic violence, or discrimination. The increase in female’s intentions to 
migrate between 2012 and 2018 could indicate a worsening of the social situation for women in 
recent years. In a region where females fall victim to high levels of gender-based violence, these 
results highlight the need to address gender issues in order to stem family migration flows. This 
data could help explain the crime victimization discrepancy mentioned above. Crime rates are 
high in all three countries, and women represent a sub-group of the population disproportionately 
abused or killed.  
Household Location 
 A household’s location, either rural or urban, became more related to family migration 
over the period studied. Rural status increased the odds of migrating in El Salvador and 
Honduras but decreased the odds of migrating in Guatemala. This is initially surprising given 
Guatemala’s extreme vulnerability to climate change and history of indigenous discrimination in 
the rural areas. When considering the context of rural poverty, the results make more sense. In 
2016, 54% of Guatemala experienced rural poverty which could explain the lack of migration 
intentions by rural families.70 Guatemala also possesses the most numerous indigenous 
 
70 Marrone. “Poverty in Central America: Advancement and Needs.” The Borgen Project. 
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population of the three countries. Language barriers and the high monetary costs of migration 
may limit this large subset of the population from leaving the country.  
Honduras and El Salvador possess higher crime rates than Guatemala which could 
contribute to increased rural families intending to migrate. Though crime rates in the previous 
regressions appeared to discourage intentions to migrate, they could not be capturing the reality 
of the nuanced situation in rural areas in both countries. It can be inferred that there is less 
accountability in the rural areas because criminal actors and corrupt law enforcement have less 
oversight. Thus the desperation to escape violent crime could be higher in these two countries 
despite economic insecurities. The female murder rate is much higher in El Salvador (10.2 per 
every 100,000) and Honduras (5.8 per every 100,000) than in Guatemala (2 per every 100,000).71 
Females in rural areas fleeing violence could also explain why Guatemala is the outlier in this 
case.  
Lastly, all three countries are extremely vulnerable to climate change, a process that 
disproportionately affects rural areas with an agrarian workforce. Though it seems another factor 
is hindering rural migrants from leaving in Guatemala, more prevalent droughts in the dry 
corridor could push migrant families in Honduras and El Salvador to intend to migrate. The 
agrarian sector’s percentage of the workforce is declining faster between 2012 and 2018 in El 
Salvador and Honduras than in Guatemala. The percentage of agriculture employment during 
this period dropped from 37% to 30% in Honduras and nearly 21% to 16% in El Salvador. In 
Guatemala, the agrarian workforce remained constant over the two years (32.26% in 2012 and 
31.5% in 2018).72 Guatemala’s rural families are less inclined to express intentions to migrate 
resulting in relatively consistent agriculture employment.  
 
71 “At Least 2,795 Women Were Victims of Feminicide”… ECLAC.   
72 “The World Bank in El Salvador.” The World Bank. 
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Household Economic Status 
 Lastly, I hypothesized that the relationship of self-reported economic status and 
intentions to migrate would decrease relative to other factors like crime victimization, gender, 
and rural vs. urban status. The results proved contrary to the hypothesis in which household 
situation was related to intentions to migrate for both years in Guatemala and El Salvador but 
actually became more related in Honduras in 2018. The results for all three countries conclude 
that Northern Triangle families with less income report less willingness to migrate. Though 
many migrants are labeled as desperate to escape the harsh realities of life in the Northern 
Triangle, this research suggests that the most desperate ones may never get the opportunity to 
leave.  
Some migrant families who may desire to leave likely cannot afford to pay for 
transportation out of the country or for a guide to lead them across international borders. 
Families understand the realities of organized crime along the way and the potential of paying 
criminal actors upon entering their territory may be too daunting. Those with higher economic 
status may receive remittances from family members already in the destination country. Their 
social connections abroad and newfound ability to pay may encourage them to leave as opposed 
to poorer migrants with no international networks. Even if families have relatives abroad, the 
costs of starting over in a new country are extremely high especially coming from a region where 
families live on a couple dollars per day. Surely the financial, physical, and emotional burden of 
leaving is too much to bear for many migrant families.  
Conclusions  
The results show an increase in the relationship between Northern Triangle families’ 
intentions to migrate and the four variables studied (respectively crime victimization, gender, 
household location, and household economic status). This shift correlates with large migration 
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wave of families in the region which occurred between 2012 and 2018. The increase in strength 
between the relationships of crime victimization, gender, household economic situation, and 
household location research has identified four variables intimately connected with intentions to 
migrate at a statistically significant level and how those relationships have grown over time.   
This research also suggests a correlation between higher economic status intentions to 
migrate.  Whereas US news media emphasizes the desperation of the Northern Triangle families 
travelling to the border, these results express that some of the poorest families who seek better 
life abroad may be forced to stay because they cannot afford to leave. Those with lower 
economic status may not possess the necessary funds or connections to actually make the 
journey. The testimonies of those who survived the migrant trail are harrowing, but the data 
suggests that those who remain in the Triangle may have even more grueling stories to tell. This 
is also an important insight for policy makers because it could suggest that increasing the 
economic situation alone may not help stem the migrant flow to destination countries. The 
problems for migrant families are deeper than the lack of money in their wallets. Increasing 
income may actually encourage migrants to leave because they possess the newfound resources. 
This research suggests that addressing non-economic variables like social inequality, corrupt law 
enforcement, and rising global temperatures is fundamental to changing families’ perspectives on 
migration.  
Gender discrimination is intimately connected with female migration in the region, and 
the data suggests that it has either gotten worse or women have had enough of chronic 
discrimination and violence. Being a female increases the logged odds of migration in all three 
countries by over 40% in a way that it hasn’t in the past. Confronting the systemic gender 
inequality and violence proves essential to encourage women to stay. Providing more economic 
opportunities for women, encouraging female education, and offering justice for gender related 
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crimes would improve the daily lives of Northern Triangle women and perhaps discourage them 
from intending to migrate. Finally, rural status is also an important indicator for migration in 
Honduras and El Salvador. Though the study does not analyze the different aspects that 
specifically affect rural living such as susceptibility to deep poverty, climate change, and 
indigenous discrimination, rural status increases probability of families intending to migrate. The 
results imply that one or multiple components of rural livelihoods are pushing migrants to leave 
in recent years in a new way. Uncovering which rural variable sparks this change is important to 
addressing migration patterns.   
Addressing the Humanitarian Crisis 
 Documenting the factors which encourage families to leave and how they have changed 
over time is fundamental to understanding migration waves and patterns in the Western 
Hemisphere. This report will add to the sparse academic literature regarding both family and 
Northern Triangle migration while serving as tool for academics and policy makers alike to 
better understand the critical migration situation in the region. The influx of families has stressed 
the capacity of the Mexican and American governments to process immigrants and pressured the 
Northern Triangle governments to find an immediate solution. Research such as this offers a first 
step in trying to address this new international crisis.  
 In the wake of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), the vulnerable Northern Triangle 
migrant populations continue to suffer. Immediate border closures and lockdowns prohibit some 
families from leaving, stop those travelling in their tracks, and trap others in shelters and 
detention centers. Some shelters have even closed down leaving families without a place to 
sleep. Guidance by leaders all over the world is to stay at home, “but the migrants don’t have 
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homes.”73 There is no safe place for these families. Their past home is unstable and their future 
one is uncertain. When this is all over, there will likely be another wave of migrant families 
coming from the Northern Triangle. In this case, we will begin where we left off: pondering how 
to solve the crisis in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Perhaps this research, among other 
works that seek to give justice and dignity to the migrant plight, will provide guidance on how to 
do just that. 
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Table 1: Crosstabs Results 
 Honduras 
2012 
Honduras 
2018 
Guatemala 
2012 
Guatemala 
2018 
El 
Salvador 
2012 
El 
Salvador 
2018 
Victim of Crime 34.3% 25.7% 35.2% 27.2% 27.2% 29.8% 
Recipient of 
Remittances 
29.9% 30.9% 20.5% 17.7% 28.8% 30.9% 
Age 18-27 years 39.7% 41% 28.4% 42.5% 32.9% 47% 
Age 28-37 years 36.8% 30.3% 38.6% 28.8% 43.4% 25.8% 
Age 38-47 years 17.6% 18% 21.6% 19.1% 15.4% 13.6% 
Age 48+ years 5.9% 10.7% 11.4% 9.7% 8.4% 13.6% 
Men 44.1% 56.5% 62.5% 57.5% 52.4% 50.8% 
Women 55.9% 43.5% 37.5% 42.5% 47.6% 49.2% 
0-5 years of 
education 
26.5% 20.8% 19.3% 27.7% 20.4% 15.2% 
6-11 years of 
education 
54.4% 50.9% 53.4% 47.1% 52.4% 53.8% 
12+ years of 
education 
19.1% 28.2% 27.3% 25.3% 27.2% 30.9% 
Salary is Good 
Enough 
14.7% 3.5% 1.1% 6.8% 2.7% 7.8% 
Salary is Just 
Enough 
33.8% 14.9% 24.1% 27.1% 28.1% 30.3% 
Salary is Not 
Enough/Stretched 
35.3% 41.9% 67.8% 46.6% 40.4% 36.4% 
Salary is Not 
Enough/Having a 
Hard Time 
16.2% 39.8% 6.9% 19.5% 28.8% 25.5% 
Urban 63.2% 56.3% 44.3% 40.5% 70.7% 66.5% 
Rural 36.8% 43.7% 55.7% 59.5% 29.3% 33.5% 
Employed 56.5% 46.9% 72.7% 50.3% 61.2% 50% 
 B 
Unemployed 15.9% 28.4% 13.6% 26.2% 12.2% 23.5% 
Student  4.3% 4.1% 1.1% 5.7% 2.0% 8.1% 
Caring for the 
Home 
23.2% 19.7% 12.5% 17.4% 24.5% 16.7% 
Retired 0% 0.9% 0% 0.3% 0% 1.7% 
Table 1: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table summarizes the crosstabs percentages for 
Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador for 2012 and 2018. 
 
Table 2: Percentage Change in Crosstabs Results from 2012 to 2018 
 Honduras Guatemala El Salvador 
Victim of Crime -8.6% -8% +2.6% 
Recipient of 
Remittances 
+1% -2.8% +2.1% 
Age 18-27 years +1.3% +14.1% +14.1% 
Age 28-37 years -6.5% -9.8% -17.6% 
Age 38-47 years +0.4% -2.5% -1.8% 
Age 48+ years +4.8% -1.7% +5.2% 
Men +12.4% -5% -1.6% 
Women -12.4% +5% +1.6% 
0-5 years of education -5.7% +8.4% -5.2% 
6-11 years of education -3.5% +6.3% +1.4% 
12+ years of education +9.1% -2% +3.7% 
Salary is Good Enough -11.2% +5.7% +5.1% 
Salary is Just Enough -18.9% +3% +2.2% 
Salary is Not 
Enough/Stretched 
+6.6% -12.6% -4% 
Salary is Not 
Enough/Having a Hard 
Time 
+23.6% +12.6% -3.3% 
Urban -6.9% -3.8% -4.2% 
Rural +6.9% +3.8% +4.2% 
Employed -9.6% -22.4% -11.2% 
Unemployed +12.9% +12.6% +11.3% 
Student -0.2% +4.6% +6.1% 
Caring for the Home -3.5% +4.9% -7.8% 
Retired +0.9% +0.3% +1.7% 
Table 2: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages between 2012 
and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. 
 
Table 3: Regression Analysis Results 
 
 Honduras 
2012 
Honduras 
2018 
Guatemala 
2012 
Guatemala 
2018 
El Salvador 
2012 
El Salvador 
2018 
Constant       
Regression 
Coefficient (B) 
-4.044*** -1.654*** -0.697 -2.051*** -0.902 -3.074*** 
Standard Error 
(S.E.) 
1.262 0.614 1.200 0.720 0.974 0.776 
 C 
Logged Odds 
(exp(B)) 
0.018 0.191 0.498 0.129 0.406 0.046 
Crime 
Victimization 
      
B 0.700** 0.269 0.636** 0.592*** 0.443 0.722*** 
S.E 0.301 0.169 0.270 0.178 0.250 0.198 
(exp(b)) 2.014 01.308 1.888 1.807 1.558 2.059 
Gender       
B -0.178 0.430*** 0.559** 0.537*** 0.380 0.337* 
S.E. 0.332 0.158 0.278 0.167 0.259 0.194 
(exp(B)) 0.837 1.537 1.749 1.710 1.462 1.401 
Household 
Economic 
Situation 
      
B -0.090 -0.481*** -0.498*** -0.261*** -0.566*** -0.245** 
S.E. 0.172 0.085 0.177 0.095 0.138 0.104 
(exp(B)) 0.914 0.618 0.608 0.770 0.568 0.783 
Household 
Location 
      
B 0.232 0.271* -0.247 -0.317** 0.372 0.331* 
S.E. 0.295 0.140 0.266 0.157 0.096 0.187 
(exp(B)) 1.261 1.311 0.781 0.728 1.451 1.393 
Number of 
Cases 
700 1069 694 993 597 773 
Cox-Snell R-
Squared 
0.078 0.108 0.082 0.077 0.978 0.090 
Nagelkerke R-
Squared 
0.157 0.157 0.155 0.111 0.117 0.129 
*statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval 
**statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval  
*** statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval 
Table 3: This table shows the p-value and logged odds results of the binary logistic regression analysis for crime 
victimization, gender, household economic situation, and rural vs. urban status. (P values labelled as 0.000 mean 
that the value was less than 0.001 and therefore was rounded down). The constant values are consistent for each 
independent variable.  
 
 
 
SPSS El Salvador: Crosstabs 2012 Results 
 
Crime Victimization 
 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones 
de irse a vivir o a trabajar 
a otro país en los próximo 
Total Sí No 
Sí Count 40 68 108 
 D 
¿ha sido usted víctima de 
algún acto de 
delincuencia en los 
últimos 12 meses? Es 
% within ¿Tiene usted 
intenciones de irse a vivir o a 
trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
27.2% 14.3% 17.3
% 
No Count 107 409 516 
% within ¿Tiene usted 
intenciones de irse a vivir o a 
trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
72.8% 85.7% 82.7
% 
Total Count 147 477 624 
% within ¿Tiene usted 
intenciones de irse a vivir o a 
trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0
% 
 
Remittances 
 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones 
de irse a vivir o a trabajar a 
otro país en los próximo 
Total Sí No 
¿Usted o alguien que vive en su 
casa recibe remesas, es decir, 
ayuda económica d 
Sí Count 42 83 125 
% within ¿Tiene usted 
intenciones de irse a vivir o 
a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
28.8% 17.4% 20.1% 
No Count 104 394 498 
% within ¿Tiene usted 
intenciones de irse a vivir o 
a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
71.2% 82.6% 79.9% 
Total Count 146 477 623 
% within ¿Tiene usted 
intenciones de irse a vivir o 
a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Age 
 E 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
Total Sí No 
Age in years 1.00 Count 47 114 161 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
32.9% 24.4% 26.4% 
2.00 Count 62 171 233 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
43.4% 36.6% 38.2% 
3.00 Count 22 123 145 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
15.4% 26.3% 23.8% 
4.00 Count 12 59 71 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
8.4% 12.6% 11.6% 
Total Count 143 467 610 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Gender 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir 
o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
Total Sí No 
Género Hombre Count 77 203 280 
% within ¿Tiene usted 
intenciones de irse a vivir o a 
trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
52.4% 42.4% 44.7% 
Mujer Count 70 276 346 
% within ¿Tiene usted 
intenciones de irse a vivir o a 
trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
47.6% 57.6% 55.3% 
Total Count 147 479 626 
 F 
% within ¿Tiene usted 
intenciones de irse a vivir o a 
trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Years of Schooling 
 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse 
a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en 
los próximo 
Total Sí No 
Years of Schooling 1.00 Count 30 165 195 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
20.4% 34.6% 31.3% 
2.00 Count 77 195 272 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
52.4% 40.9% 43.6% 
3.00 Count 40 117 157 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
27.2% 24.5% 25.2% 
Total Count 147 477 624 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Salary 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones 
de irse a vivir o a 
trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
Total Sí No 
El salario o 
sueldo que usted 
recibe y el total 
del ingreso de su 
hogar: 
Les alcanza 
bien y pueden 
ahorrar 
Count 4 26 30 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
2.7% 5.5% 4.8% 
Count 41 154 195 
 G 
Les alcanza 
justo sin 
grandes 
dificultades 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
28.1% 32.6% 31.5% 
No les alcanza 
y tienen 
dificultades 
Count 59 189 248 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
40.4% 40.0% 40.1% 
No les alcanza 
y tienen 
grandes 
dificultades 
Count 42 104 146 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
28.8% 22.0% 23.6% 
Total Count 146 473 619 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Household Location 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones 
de irse a vivir o a trabajar a 
otro país en los próximo 
Total Sí No 
Usar definición 
censal del país 
Urbano Count 104 283 387 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
70.7% 59.1% 61.8% 
Rural Count 43 196 239 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
29.3% 40.9% 38.2% 
Total Count 147 479 626 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Employment Status  
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro 
país en los próximo Total 
 H 
Sí No 
Employment 
Status 
1.00 Count 90 252 342 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
61.2% 52.7% 54.7% 
2.00 Count 18 33 51 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
12.2% 6.9% 8.2% 
3.00 Count 3 3 6 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
2.0% 0.6% 1.0% 
4.00 Count 36 183 219 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
24.5% 38.3% 35.0% 
5.00 Count 0 7 7 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
0.0% 1.5% 1.1% 
Total Count 147 478 625 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
SPSS El Salvador: Crosstabs 2018 Results 
Crime Victimization 
 
Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
Víctima de 
delincuencia en los 
últimos 12 meses 
Sí Count 70 106 176 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar 
en otro país 
29.8% 16.7% 20.2% 
No Count 165 530 695 
 I 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar 
en otro país 
70.2% 83.3% 79.8% 
Total Count 235 636 871 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar 
en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Remittances 
 
Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
Recibe 
remesas 
Sí Count 73 114 187 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país 30.9% 18.0% 21.5% 
No Count 163 520 683 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país 69.1% 82.0% 78.5% 
Total Count 236 634 870 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Gender 
 
Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro 
país 
Total Sí No 
Sexo Hombre Count 120 281 401 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
50.8% 44.0% 45.9% 
Mujer Count 116 357 473 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
49.2% 56.0% 54.1% 
Total Count 236 638 874 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Household Location 
 J 
 
Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
Urbano/Rural Urbano Count 157 368 525 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro 
país 
66.5% 57.7% 60.1% 
Rural Count 79 270 349 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro 
país 
33.5% 42.3% 39.9% 
Total Count 236 638 874 
    
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro 
país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Household Economic Situation 
 
Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
La situación 
económica 
familiar 
Les alcanza bien y 
pueden ahorrar 
Count 18 33 51 
% within Intenciones de vivir 
o trabajar en otro país 
7.8% 5.4% 6.1% 
Les alcanza justo sin 
grandes dificultades 
Count 70 178 248 
% within Intenciones de vivir 
o trabajar en otro país 
30.3% 29.2% 29.5% 
No les alcanza y tienen 
dificultades 
Count 84 254 338 
% within Intenciones de vivir 
o trabajar en otro país 
36.4% 41.7% 40.2% 
No les alcanza y tienen 
grandes dificultades 
Count 59 144 203 
% within Intenciones de vivir 
o trabajar en otro país 
25.5% 23.6% 24.2% 
Total Count 231 609 840 
% within Intenciones de vivir 
o trabajar en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 K 
Age 
 
Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
Age in years 1.00 Count 111 174 285 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro 
país 
47.0% 27.3% 32.6% 
2.00 Count 61 159 220 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro 
país 
25.8% 24.9% 25.2% 
3.00 Count 32 163 195 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro 
país 
13.6% 25.5% 22.3% 
4.00 Count 32 142 174 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro 
país 
13.6% 22.3% 19.9% 
Total Count 236 638 874 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro 
país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Education  
 
Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
Education in years 1.00 Count 34 145 179 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
15.2% 24.8% 22.2% 
2.00 Count 120 262 382 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
53.8% 44.8% 47.3% 
3.00 Count 69 178 247 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
30.9% 30.4% 30.6% 
Total Count 223 585 808 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 L 
Employment Status  
 
Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
Employment Status 1.00 Count 117 314 431 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en 
otro país 
50.0% 49.4% 49.6% 
2.00 Count 55 93 148 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en 
otro país 
23.5% 14.6% 17.0% 
3.00 Count 19 29 48 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en 
otro país 
8.1% 4.6% 5.5% 
4.00 Count 39 183 222 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en 
otro país 
16.7% 28.8% 25.5% 
5.00 Count 4 16 20 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en 
otro país 
1.7% 2.5% 2.3% 
Total Count 234 635 869 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en 
otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
 
SPSS Guatemala: Crosstabs 2012 Results 
 
Crime Victimization 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones 
de irse a vivir o a trabajar a 
otro país en los próximo 
Total Sí No 
Sí Count 31 122 153 
 M 
¿Ha sido usted víctima 
de algún acto de 
delincuencia en los 
últimos 12 meses?. E 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en 
los próximo 
35.2% 19.4% 21.4% 
No Count 57 506 563 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en 
los próximo 
64.8% 80.6% 78.6% 
Total Count 88 628 716 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en 
los próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Remittances 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro 
país en los próximo 
Total Sí No 
[RECOGER 
Tarjeta F] ¿Usted o 
alguien que vive en 
su casa recibe 
remesas, es deci 
Sí Count 18 37 55 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
20.5% 5.9% 7.7% 
No Count 70 592 662 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
79.5% 94.1% 92.3% 
Total Count 88 629 717 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Age 
 
 N 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
Total Sí No 
Age in years 1.00 Count 25 112 137 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
28.4% 17.8% 19.1% 
2.00 Count 34 211 245 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
38.6% 33.5% 34.1% 
3.00 Count 19 197 216 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
21.6% 31.3% 30.1% 
4.00 Count 10 110 120 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
11.4% 17.5% 16.7% 
Total Count 88 630 718 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Gender 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse 
a vivir o a trabajar a otro país 
en los próximo 
Total Sí No 
[Entrevistador: 
anotar, no 
preguntar:] 
Género: 
Hombre Count 55 295 350 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones 
de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país 
en los próximo 
62.5% 46.8% 48.7% 
 O 
Mujer Count 33 335 368 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones 
de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país 
en los próximo 
37.5% 53.2% 51.3% 
Total Count 88 630 718 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones 
de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país 
en los próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Education 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones 
de irse a vivir o a trabajar 
a otro país en los próximo 
Total Sí No 
Education 
in years 
1.00 Count 17 287 304 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
19.3% 45.6% 42.3% 
2.00 Count 47 213 260 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
53.4% 33.8% 36.2% 
3.00 Count 24 130 154 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
27.3% 20.6% 21.4% 
Total Count 88 630 718 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Salary  
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones 
de irse a vivir o a trabajar 
a otro país en los próximo 
Total Sí No 
Count 1 30 31 
 P 
El salario o sueldo 
que usted recibe y 
el total del ingreso 
de su hogar: [Leer 
a 
Les alcanza 
bien y pueden 
ahorrar 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
1.1% 4.9% 4.5% 
Les alcanza 
justo sin 
grandes 
dificultades 
Count 21 210 231 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
24.1% 34.6% 33.3% 
No les alcanza y 
tienen 
dificultades 
Count 59 285 344 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
67.8% 47.0% 49.6% 
No les alcanza y 
tienen grandes 
dificultades 
Count 6 82 88 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
6.9% 13.5% 12.7% 
Total Count 87 607 694 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0
% 
 
Household Location  
 
¿Tiene usted 
intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a 
otro país en los 
próximo Total 
S
í No  
Urbano Count 39 263 302 
 Q 
Urbano / rural 
[Usar definición 
censal del país] 
% within ¿Tiene usted 
intenciones de irse a vivir o 
a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
44.3% 41.7% 42.1% 
Rural {{Usar 
definición 
censal del 
país}} 
Count 49 367 416 
% within ¿Tiene usted 
intenciones de irse a vivir o 
a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
55.7% 58.3% 57.9% 
Total Count 88 630 718 
% within ¿Tiene usted 
intenciones de irse a vivir o 
a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Employment Status 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones 
de irse a vivir o a trabajar 
a otro país en los próximo 
Total Sí No 
Employment 
Status 
1.00 Count 64 415 479 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
72.7% 66.1% 66.9% 
2.00 Count 12 25 37 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
13.6% 4.0% 5.2% 
3.00 Count 1 2 3 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
1.1% 0.3% 0.4% 
4.00 Count 11 173 184 
 R 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
12.5% 27.5% 25.7% 
5.00 Count 0 13 13 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
0.0% 2.1% 1.8% 
Total Count 88 628 716 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 SPSS Guatemala: Crosstabs 2018 Results 
 
Crime Victimization  
 
Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
Víctima de 
delincuencia 
en los últimos 
12 meses 
Sí Count 81 135 216 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
27.2% 17.7% 20.4% 
No Count 217 626 843 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
72.8% 82.3% 79.6% 
Total Count 298 761 1059 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Remittances 
 
Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
Sí Count 53 102 155 
 S 
Recibe 
remesas 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
17.7% 13.4% 14.6% 
No Count 246 658 904 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
82.3% 86.6% 85.4% 
Total Count 299 760 1059 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Gender 
 
Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en 
otro país 
Total Sí No 
Sexo Hombre Count 172 336 508 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
57.5% 44.0% 47.8% 
Mujer Count 127 428 555 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
42.5% 56.0% 52.2% 
Total Count 299 764 1063 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Household Location 
 
Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
Urbano/Rural Urbano Count 121 360 481 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar 
en otro país 
40.5% 47.1% 45.2% 
Rural Count 178 404 582 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar 
en otro país 
59.5% 52.9% 54.8% 
Total Count 299 764 1063 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar 
en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Household Economic Situation 
 T 
 
Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
La situación 
económica 
familiar 
Les alcanza bien y 
pueden ahorrar 
Count 20 48 68 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro país 
6.8% 6.5% 6.6% 
Les alcanza justo 
sin grandes 
dificultades 
Count 79 259 338 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro país 
27.1% 35.3% 33.0% 
No les alcanza y 
tienen dificultades 
Count 136 312 448 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro país 
46.6% 42.6% 43.7% 
No les alcanza y 
tienen grandes 
dificultades 
Count 57 114 171 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro país 
19.5% 15.6% 16.7% 
Total Count 292 733 1025 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Education 
 
Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
Education in years 1.00 Count 80 207 287 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro país 
27.7% 27.8% 27.8% 
2.00 Count 136 354 490 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro país 
47.1% 47.5% 47.4% 
3.00 Count 73 184 257 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro país 
25.3% 24.7% 24.9% 
Total Count 289 745 1034 
 U 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Age  
 
Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
Age in years 1.00 Count 127 215 342 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
42.5% 28.1% 32.2% 
2.00 Count 86 200 286 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
28.8% 26.2% 26.9% 
3.00 Count 57 184 241 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
19.1% 24.1% 22.7% 
4.00 Count 29 165 194 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
9.7% 21.6% 18.3% 
Total Count 299 764 1063 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Employment Status  
 
Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro 
país 
Total Sí No 
Employment 
Status 
1.00 Count 150 365 515 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
50.3% 48.2% 48.8% 
2.00 Count 78 125 203 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
26.2% 16.5% 19.2% 
3.00 Count 17 23 40 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
5.7% 3.0% 3.8% 
 V 
4.00 Count 52 229 281 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
17.4% 30.3% 26.6% 
5.00 Count 1 15 16 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
0.3% 2.0% 1.5% 
Total Count 298 757 1055 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
SPSS Honduras: Crosstabs 2012 Results 
 
Crime Victimization 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro 
país en los próximo 
Total Sí No 
¿Ha sido usted 
víctima de algún 
acto de 
delincuencia en 
los últimos 12 
meses?. E 
Sí Count 23 104 127 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
34.3% 18.8% 20.5% 
No Count 44 448 492 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
65.7% 81.2% 79.5% 
Total Count 67 552 619 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Remittances 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
Total Sí No 
Sí Count 20 48 68 
 W 
[RECOGER Tarjeta 
F] ¿Usted o alguien 
que vive en su casa 
recibe remesas, es 
deci 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones 
de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro 
país en los próximo 
29.9% 8.7% 11.0% 
No Count 47 506 553 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones 
de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro 
país en los próximo 
70.1% 91.3% 89.0% 
Total Count 67 554 621 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones 
de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro 
país en los próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Age 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones 
de irse a vivir o a trabajar a 
otro país en los próximo 
Total Sí No 
age in years 1.00 Count 27 101 128 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
39.7% 18.1% 20.5% 
2.00 Count 25 201 226 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
36.8% 36.1% 36.2% 
3.00 Count 12 134 146 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
17.6% 24.1% 23.4% 
4.00 Count 4 121 125 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
5.9% 21.7% 20.0% 
Total Count 68 557 625 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Gender 
 
 X 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones 
de irse a vivir o a trabajar a 
otro país en los próximo 
Total Sí No 
[Entrevistador: 
Anotar, no 
preguntar:] 
Género: 
Hombre Count 30 270 300 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
44.1% 48.6% 48.1% 
Mujer Count 38 286 324 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
55.9% 51.4% 51.9% 
Total Count 68 556 624 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Education 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse 
a vivir o a trabajar a otro país 
en los próximo 
Total Sí No 
Education 
in years 
1.00 Count 18 180 198 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
26.5% 32.3% 31.7% 
2.00 Count 37 259 296 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
54.4% 46.5% 47.4% 
3.00 Count 13 118 131 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
19.1% 21.2% 21.0% 
Total Count 68 557 625 
 Y 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Household Economic Situation 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro 
país en los próximo 
Total Sí No 
El salario o 
sueldo que 
usted recibe y 
el total del 
ingreso de su 
hogar: [Leer a 
Les alcanza 
bien y pueden 
ahorrar 
Count 10 48 58 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
14.7% 8.7% 9.4% 
Les alcanza 
justo sin 
grandes 
dificultades 
Count 23 216 239 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
33.8% 39.2% 38.6% 
No les 
alcanza y 
tienen 
dificultades 
Count 24 208 232 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
35.3% 37.7% 37.5% 
No les 
alcanza y 
tienen 
grandes 
dificultades 
Count 11 79 90 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
16.2% 14.3% 14.5% 
Total Count 68 551 619 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de 
irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0
% 
 Z 
 
Household Location 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones 
de irse a vivir o a trabajar 
a otro país en los próximo 
Total Sí No 
[ESTRATE
R] Urbano / 
rural [Usar 
definición 
censal del 
país] 
Urbano Count 43 312 355 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
63.2% 56.1% 56.9% 
Rural {{Usar 
definición 
censal del 
país}} 
Count 25 244 269 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
36.8% 43.9% 43.1% 
Total Count 68 556 624 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Employment Status 
 
¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los 
próximo 
Total Sí No 
Employment 
Status 
1.00 Count 39 304 343 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
56.5% 54.8% 55.0% 
2.00 Count 11 69 80 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
15.9% 12.4% 12.8% 
3.00 Count 3 3 6 
 AA 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
4.3% 0.5% 1.0% 
4.00 Count 16 166 182 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
23.2% 29.9% 29.2% 
5.00 Count 0 13 13 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
0.0% 2.3% 2.1% 
Total Count 69 555 624 
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a 
vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0
% 
 
SPSS Honduras: Crosstabs 2018 Results 
 
Crime Victimization 
 
Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
Víctima de 
delincuencia 
en los 
últimos 12 
meses 
Sí Count 113 108 221 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro país 
25.7% 15.7% 19.6% 
No Count 326 578 904 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro país 
74.3% 84.3% 80.4% 
Total Count 439 686 1125 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 BB 
Remittances 
 
Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en 
otro país 
Total Sí No 
Recibe 
remesas 
Sí Count 73 114 187 
% within Intenciones de vivir 
o trabajar en otro país 
30.9% 18.0% 21.5% 
No Count 163 520 683 
% within Intenciones de vivir 
o trabajar en otro país 
69.1% 82.0% 78.5% 
Total Count 236 634 870 
% within Intenciones de vivir 
o trabajar en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Household Economic Situation 
 
Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
La situación 
económica familiar 
Les alcanza 
bien y pueden 
ahorrar 
Count 15 36 51 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro 
país 
3.5% 5.4% 4.7% 
Les alcanza 
justo sin 
grandes 
dificultades 
Count 64 144 208 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro 
país 
14.9% 21.6% 19.0% 
No les 
alcanza y 
tienen 
dificultades 
Count 180 268 448 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro 
país 
41.9% 40.2% 40.9% 
No les 
alcanza y 
tienen 
grandes 
dificultades 
Count 171 218 389 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro 
país 
39.8% 32.7% 35.5% 
Total Count 430 666 1096 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro 
país 
100.0
% 
100.0% 100.0% 
 CC 
 
Gender 
 
Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en 
otro país 
Total Sí No 
Sexo Hombre Count 248 297 545 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar 
en otro país 
56.5% 43.3% 48.4% 
Mujer Count 191 389 580 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar 
en otro país 
43.5% 56.7% 51.6% 
Total Count 439 686 1125 
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar 
en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Household Location  
 
Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
Urbano/
Rural 
Urbano Count 247 339 586 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
56.3% 49.4% 52.1% 
Rural Count 192 347 539 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
43.7% 50.6% 47.9% 
Total Count 439 686 1125 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Age 
 
Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
Age in years 1.00 Count 180 212 392 
% within Intenciones de vivir 
o trabajar en otro país 
41.0% 30.9% 34.8% 
2.00 Count 133 159 292 
 DD 
% within Intenciones de vivir 
o trabajar en otro país 
30.3% 23.2% 26.0% 
3.00 Count 79 122 201 
% within Intenciones de vivir 
o trabajar en otro país 
18.0% 17.8% 17.9% 
4.00 Count 47 193 240 
% within Intenciones de vivir 
o trabajar en otro país 
10.7% 28.1% 21.3% 
Total Count 439 686 1125 
% within Intenciones de vivir 
o trabajar en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Education  
 
Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país 
Total Sí No 
Education in years 1.00 Count 90 190 280 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro país 
20.8% 28.4% 25.5% 
2.00 Count 220 330 550 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro país 
50.9% 49.4% 50.0% 
3.00 Count 122 148 270 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro país 
28.2% 22.2% 24.5% 
Total Count 432 668 1100 
% within Intenciones de 
vivir o trabajar en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Employment Status  
 
Intenciones de vivir o trabajar 
en otro país 
Total Sí No 
Employment Status 1.00 Count 205 306 511 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
46.9% 44.9% 45.7% 
2.00 Count 124 77 201 
 EE 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
28.4% 11.3% 18.0% 
3.00 Count 18 29 47 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
4.1% 4.3% 4.2% 
4.00 Count 86 257 343 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
19.7% 37.7% 30.7% 
5.00 Count 4 12 16 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
0.9% 1.8% 1.4% 
Total Count 437 681 1118 
% within Intenciones de vivir o 
trabajar en otro país 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
SPSS El Salvador: Logistic Regression 2012 Results 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún 
acto de delincuencia en los 
últimos 12 meses? Es 
.443 .250 3.133 1 .077 1.558 
¿Usted o alguien que vive en su 
casa recibe remesas, es decir, 
ayuda económica d 
.573 .247 5.375 1 .020 1.774 
Age in years .387 .118 10.645 1 .001 1.472 
Género .380 .259 2.145 1 .143 1.462 
Years of Schooling -.166 .160 1.068 1 .301 .847 
El salario o sueldo que usted 
recibe y el total del ingreso de 
su hogar: 
-.566 .138 16.917 1 .000 .568 
Usar definición censal del 
país 
.372 .239 2.424 1 .119 1.451 
 FF 
Employment Status .146 .096 2.294 1 .130 1.157 
Constant -.902 .974 .856 1 .355 .406 
 
SPSS El Salvador: Logistic Regression 2018 Results 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Víctima de delincuencia en 
los últimos 12 meses 
.722 .198 13.318 1 .000 2.059 
Recibe remesas .622 .195 10.204 1 .001 1.863 
Age in years .493 .086 32.941 1 .000 1.638 
Sexo .337 .194 3.027 1 .082 1.401 
Education in years .081 .132 .382 1 .536 1.085 
La situación económica 
familiar 
-.245 .104 5.569 1 .018 .783 
Urbano/Rural .331 .187 3.149 1 .076 1.393 
Employment Status .060 .077 .611 1 .434 1.062 
Constant -3.074 .776 15.677 1 .000 .046 
 
SPSS Guatemala: Logistic Regression 2012 Results 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a ¿Ha sido usted víctima de 
algún acto de delincuencia en 
los últimos 12 meses?. E 
.636 .270 5.538 1 .019 1.888 
[RECOGER Tarjeta F] 
¿Usted o alguien que vive en 
su casa recibe remesas, es 
deci 
1.572 .340 21.350 1 .000 4.816 
Age in years .293 .133 4.852 1 .028 1.340 
[Entrevistador: anotar, no 
preguntar:] Género: 
.559 .278 4.050 1 .044 1.749 
Education in years -.671 .184 13.358 1 .000 .511 
El salario o sueldo que usted 
recibe y el total del ingreso 
de su hogar: [Leer a 
-.498 .177 7.899 1 .005 .608 
 GG 
Urbano / rural [Usar 
definición censal del país] 
-.247 .266 .865 1 .352 .781 
Employment Status .084 .120 .489 1 .484 1.088 
Constant -.697 1.200 .338 1 .561 .498 
 
SPSS Guatemala: Logistic Regression 2018 Results 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Víctima de delincuencia 
en los últimos 12 meses 
.592 .178 11.060 1 .001 1.807 
Recibe remesas .420 .203 4.292 1 .038 1.522 
Age in years .438 .076 33.162 1 .000 1.550 
Sexo .537 .167 10.377 1 .001 1.710 
Education in years .211 .117 3.274 1 .070 1.235 
La situación económica 
familiar 
-.261 .095 7.582 1 .006 .770 
Urbano/Rural -.317 .157 4.090 1 .043 .728 
Employment Status .097 .068 2.024 1 .155 1.102 
Constant -2.051 .720 8.108 1 .004 .129 
 
SPSS Honduras: Logistic Regression 2012 Results 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún 
acto de delincuencia en los 
últimos 12 meses?. E 
.700 .301 5.398 1 .020 2.014 
[RECOGER Tarjeta F] ¿Usted o 
alguien que vive en su casa recibe 
remesas, es deci 
1.630 .339 23.171 1 .000 5.104 
age in years .638 .158 16.274 1 .000 1.893 
[Entrevistador: Anotar, no 
preguntar:] Género: 
-.178 .332 .287 1 .592 .837 
Education in years .207 .215 .931 1 .335 1.230 
El salario o sueldo que usted 
recibe y el total del ingreso de su 
hogar: [Leer a 
-.090 .172 .273 1 .601 .914 
 HH 
[ESTRATER] Urbano / rural 
[Usar definición censal del país] 
.232 .295 .619 1 .431 1.261 
Employment Status .170 .129 1.730 1 .188 1.186 
Constant -4.044 1.262 10.265 1 .001 .018 
 
SPSS Honduras: Logistic Regression 2018 Results 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Víctima de delincuencia 
en los últimos 12 meses 
.269 .169 2.512 1 .113 1.308 
Recibe remesas .646 .162 15.939 1 .000 1.908 
Age in years .401 .064 39.015 1 .000 1.494 
Sexo .430 .158 7.440 1 .006 1.537 
Education in years -.135 .105 1.674 1 .196 .873 
La situación económica 
familiar 
-.481 .085 31.961 1 .000 .618 
Urbano/Rural .271 .140 3.737 1 .053 1.311 
Employment Status .131 .060 4.775 1 .029 1.140 
Constant -1.654 .614 7.255 1 .007 .191 
 
